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Abstract 
Transitional justice is affected by the moment it emerged in the international system, 
the post-Cold War era. Its form was distorted by the international context into which 
it was born: the dissolution of the bipolar Cold War political order, the triumph of the 
United States as the world’s sole hegemon, and the cascading wave of liberalization 
that crashed across the globe. Transitional justice was shaped by this political 
moment, as it absorbed important tenets of liberal internationalism. Transitional 
justice also helped shape this political moment, as it became a solution to the problem 
that illiberal non-democratic, conflicted states pose to the success of the liberal 
internationalist vision. The result is that considerations in transitional justice that 
should have intrinsic merit, including the ‘local,’ the ‘victim’ and indeed, ‘justice’, 
become instrumentalized in the service of this overarching liberal social project. 
Ultimately, transitional justice fails to realize its emancipatory potential. 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
 “Memory, itself, is a disciplinary mechanism... it selects for what is important (the 
histories of triumph), it reads a continuous narrative into one full of ruptures and 
contradictions, and it sets precedents for other ‘memorializations.’” 1  
 
The transitional justice moment has truly arrived. From its humble origins as a 
nameless literature at the margins of disparate fields, transitional justice has become a 
coherent field of scholarship, policy, and practice. It has made meaningful strides 
towards inclusion in the normative workings of the international system. Transitional 
justice has succeeded in creating a vast and expanding academic and practical 
literature, and marshalled a dedicated following of scholars, practitioners and 
policymakers to its cause. Counted amongst its adherents is Kofi Annan, the former 
Secretary General of the United Nations. In a Report of the Secretary-General to the 
United Nations, Annan established his commitment to the field, as transitional justice 
is “essential to… the international community’s efforts to enhance human rights.”2 
For Annan, transitional justice is one “mutually reinforcing imperative” alongside 
long-standing international commitments to peace and democracy.3 This high level of 
rhetorical dedication has been matched by an incredible amount of expenditure and 
practical implementation.4 No less than thirty-five countries have implemented truth 
commissions to investigate mass atrocity; the hallmark International Criminal 
Tribunals of Rwanda and Yugoslavia occurred; and the ratification of the Rome 
Statute constructing the International Criminal Court (ICC) stands as a crowning 
achievement of transitional justice discourse and doctrine. 5  Indeed, a veritable 
transformation has occurred under the auspices of transitional justice.  
                                                 
1 Judith Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2011), 15. 
2 Kofi Annan, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies Report 
of the Secretary-General, (New York: United Nations Security Council, 2004), 4. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Vesna Bojicic´-Dzelilovic´, “World Bank, NGOs and the Private Sector in Post-War Reconstruction,” 
International Peacekeeping 9, no. 2 (2002), 90. 
5 Joanna R. Quinn, “Introduction,” in Reconciliation(s): Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies, 
ed. Joanna R. Quinn (Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 3. 
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The fact that this expansion occurred in such a compressed time frame, a mere 
25 years, is remarkable. More remarkable, still, is the crossroads at which transitional 
justice now finds itself. The correct posture of transitional justice in relation to states, 
institutions and the international community is the topic of heated debate. Granted, 
the tone of these discussions is not always critical. Often, these debates can take the 
shape of practical ‘internal’ disagreements, concerning the proper sequencing of 
mechanisms or the right manner in which to deal with questions of sovereignty. In 
this case, the terms of the debate are confined to the bounds of transitional justice 
practice. There are, however, growing concerns about the value and vision of 
transitional justice as an enterprise. For some, the rapid enlargement of transitional 
justice has presented a ‘paradox of success,’ whereby the field is left vulnerable to 
failure, manipulation and critique.6 In the policy realm, there is reason to believe that 
the swift acceptance and application of transitional justice has presented practitioners 
with a dilemma as the paradigms they hope to implement are insufficiently 
theorized.7 On the theory side, a growing chorus of critical scholars has begun to 
challenge the normative aspects of the field, mounting incisive criticisms of the aims, 
ambitions and assumptions undergirding transitional justice practice. 8  This thesis 
finds its grounding in this comprehensive critical reflection on the field. In the midst 
of this ‘premature midlife crisis,’ an examination of the core assumptions and 
practices of transitional justice is timely.9 The intended aim of this research is not to 
discard the theory and practice of transitional justice wholesale, but rather to subject 
the framework that underlies transitional justice to further scrutiny. Laying bare the 
problematic assumptions that frame the transitional justice enterprise presents the 
opportunity for change, and opens a space to imagine transitional anew.  
Here, a brief primer on transitional justice is necessary. As the breadth of 
transitional justice has widened over the course of the past two decades, the meaning 
                                                 
6 Lauren Marie Balasco, “The Transitions of Transitional Justice: Mapping the Waves from Promise to 
Practice,” Journal of Human Rights 12, no. 2 (2013). 
7 Moses Okello, “Afterword: Elevating Transitional Local Justice or Crystallizing Global 
Governance?,” in Localizing transitional justice: Interventions and priorities after mass violence, ed. 
Rosalind Shaw, Lars Waldorf, and Pierre Hazan (United States: Stanford University Press, 2010), 276. 
8 Christine Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field,’” 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 (2008), 13. 
9 Ibid. 
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of the term itself has also considerably broadened. 10  What began as a literature 
primarily concerned with transitions from authoritarianism to democracy now 
commands a prolific literature on intractable civil conflict, humanitarian crisis and 
international intervention.11 As the post-Cold War era presented new challenges to the 
attainment of transitional justice goals, these issues were woven into the definition of 
transitional justice itself. What is central to all of these meanings is the concept of 
‘transition,’ which implies a linear progression from one state of being to another: 
usually from war to peace or from authoritarianism to democracy.12 Joanna R. Quinn 
identifies four strands of consideration in transitional justice canon, each with its own 
set of paradigmatic debates: memory and remembering, truth, peacebuilding and the 
transformation of institutions, and forgiveness.13 According to Quinn, all four strands 
of transitional justice analysis coalesce around a desire for reconciliation, which is a 
dynamic process of rebuilding society after mass atrocity. 14  Transitional justice 
theory, then, is concerned with the philosophy, politics and pragmatic aspects of 
‘transition’, an extended meditation on the question of “how to approach the past.”15  
 But there is more. Chandra Lekha Sriram argues that transitional justice is 
also an “active domain of policy,” which is practiced by the United Nations, 
supported by NGOs, and bilateral donors.16 This is because processes of transition are 
understood to be traumatic, raising “fundamental issues regarding law, morality and 
politics,” as societies struggle to “find solutions to legacies of violence.” 17 
Undergoing a ‘transition’ produces “resulting questions of justice,” which the 
                                                 
10 Christine Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field,’” 
9. 
11 Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional 
Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009), 343-345. 
12 For more on the politics of the ‘transitions paradigm,’ see Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ 
Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice.” 
13 Joanna R. Quinn, “Introduction,” 4. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Kora Andrieu, “Civilizing Peacebuilding: Transitional Justice, Civil Society and the Liberal 
Paradigm,” Security Dialogue 41, no. 5 (2010), 537. 
16 Ibid., 583. 
17 Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Carmen Gonzalez-Enriquez, and Paloma Aguilar, “Introduction,” in 
The Politics of Memory and Democratization: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies, ed. 
Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Carmen Gonzalez-Enriquez, and Paloma Aguilar (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 1. 
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introduction of transitional justice mechanisms are meant to address. 18  These 
mechanisms can include any combination of trials, truth commissions, lustration, 
amnesty and pardon.19  
These mechanisms are themselves representative of certain paradigmatic 
debates within the field of transitional justice, about the relative primacy of truth or 
peace in relation to justice. These paradigmatic differences are the result of the 
divergent silos of knowledge from which transitional justice emerged. According to 
Christine Bell, transitional justice is caught in a contest between competing aims, 
including “an ongoing battle against impunity rooted in human rights discourse; a set 
of conflict-resolution techniques related to constitution-making; and a tool for 
international state-building in the aftermath of atrocity.”20 In order to gain a clear 
view of the field, I will now consider each of these paradigms in turn. 
The three foundational paradigms of transitional justice are retributive, 
restorative and reparative. The retributive paradigm in transitional justice takes its 
start from the foundational underpinnings of the criminal justice system in many 
Western countries. It begins with the assumption that “someone who has done wrong 
should suffer some penalty as a result of what he has done because that suffering is 
the appropriate consequence to him of the wrongdoing for which he is responsible.”21 
There are varying rationales for the retributive paradigm, but they usually include the 
public acknowledgement of wrong-doing, the punishment of the perpetrator, a 
reverberating educative effect for the public, a reinforcement of the ‘rule of law,’ and 
a restored legitimacy in the legal institutions. 22  Those that follow the retributive 
paradigm are likely to advocate for the use of trials and tribunals as transitional 
justice mechanisms, acting in the name of formal, institutional justice. 
The restorative justice paradigm takes a rather different approach to the 
retributive paradigm, rather than punishing the perpetrator it seeks to “restore both the 
                                                 
18 Joanna R. Quinn, “Introduction,” 3. 
19 Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of Transitional 
Justice,” Global Society 21, no. 4 (2007), 584. 
20 Ibid., 13. 
21 Trudy Govier, Forgiveness and Revenge (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2002), 15. 
22 Joanna R. Quinn, ‘Transitional Justice’, in Human Rights: Politics and Practice, by Michael 
Goodhart, ed. Michael Goodhart (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 330 
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victim and perpetrator of crimes back into harmony with the community.”23 There are 
three rationales for restorative justice: a focus on harm, the conception that harm 
results in obligations to society and victims, and that it promotes engagement or 
participation.24 The primary mechanism following from the restorative approach has 
been one of the most successful, the truth commission. Here, pardon in the name of 
‘settling accounts’ of the truth is common. This is because the aim of the restorative 
paradigm is fundamentally non-retributive; it takes its strength from stitching social 
ties back together again. 
The reparative justice paradigm is centered on the concept of ‘repairing’ that 
which was broken within the community in order for the mass violation of human 
rights to have occurred. While also a critique of the retributive paradigm, it is more 
concerned with “making right what went wrong,” in materially and symbolically 
ways.25 There are three rationales for reparative justice: “restoring the rule of law 
through reforms to prisons, police and judiciary; rectifying human rights violations 
through trials, reparation and traditional mechanisms; and redressing the inequalities 
and distributive injustices that underlie war.”26 This is a more structural approach to 
transitional justice than the one advocated by either the retributive and restorative 
paradigms, and as such, is more capable of addressing the grievances that caused and 
exacerbated conflict in the first instance.  
These paradigms may seem quite different at first glance, but I argue that their 
end goals are indistinguishable. The retributive, restorative and reparative paradigms 
may offer different diagnoses of the social ills and prescribe divergent mechanisms, 
but they envision an identical social and political world. This is true whether the 
scholars are interested in trials or truth commissions as instruments to bring about this 
political world, or paradigmatically focused on retribution or restoration. Transitional 
justice scholars see the proper political alignment as one informed by liberal 
democracy, a liberal citizenry and a social world constituted by the specific civic 
virtues of toleration, equality and rule of law. Therefore, the distinction between these 
                                                 
23 Joanna Quinn, ‘Transitional Justice,’ 333. 
24 Howard Zehr, Little Book of Restorative Justice (United States: Good Books, U.S., 2002), 23-24. 
25 Joanna Quinn, ‘Transitional Justice,’ 336. 
26 Rosemary Nagy, “Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical Reflections,” Third World 
Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2008), 277. 
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paradigms is a difference of process, or the manner of bringing about the world these 
scholars envision. The goals of transitional justice include establishing the rule of 
law, accountability, and democracy, but there are more.27 Martha Minow outlines 
several “overlapping aspirations” of transitional justice including the end of violence, 
overcoming denial, promoting reconciliation and psychological healing, punishing 
and excluding perpetrators, renouncing atrocity, and building an international order to 
prevent and respond to atrocity.28  
I began this study by considering the margins of transitional justice, and the 
opportunities available for subaltern actors and populations to ‘make’ transitional 
justice as they see fit. Essentially, I considered the possibility and method of agency 
in the face of hegemonic constraints presented by transitional justice discourse and its 
institutions. While Antonio Gramsci coined the word ‘subaltern,’ my consideration of 
the subaltern subject in transitional justice followed from the assumption and 
redeployment of the concept from postcolonial scholars such as Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak and Ranajit Guha.29 In this tradition, the concept of the subaltern retained its 
emphasis on “people in a particular society suffering under hegemonic domination,” 
but was considerably widened. Scholars such as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak included 
include the racialized international division of labor, and added the critical dimension 
of ‘voice.’30 The subaltern is a subject, constituted and created by the hegemonic 
forces which she endures. The subaltern is characterized by an ‘inability to speak,’ a 
subordination that subalterns can subvert through acts of resistance or partial 
acceptance. Scholars of Subaltern Studies emphasize the situational nature of 
subalternity, which allows for its consideration outside of considerations strictly 
                                                 
27 See Padraig McAuliffe, “Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law: The Perfect Couple or Awkward 
Bedfellows?,” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 2, no. 02 (2010), James A. McAdams, ed., 
Transitional Justice and the Rules of Law in New Democracies (United States: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1997). 
28 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass 
Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 88. 
29 El Habib Louai, "Retracing the Concept of the Subaltern from Gramsci to Spivak: Historical 
Developments and New Applications," African Journal of History and Culture 4, no. 1 (2012), 5.; 
Ranajit Guha, The Small Voice of History: Collected Essays, ed. Partha Chatterjee (India: Permanent 
Black, 2009); Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, eds., Selected Subaltern Studies (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
30 Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, eds., Selected Subaltern Studies. 
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related to class struggle.31 The subaltern intersects with transitional justice at many 
interfaces, but most importantly, the subaltern is often constituted as a subject: the 
victim-subject and the ‘local’-subject, are two constructions investigated in this 
thesis. As the ‘international community’ dictates and bounds the process of 
‘transition,’ the study of the subaltern lends itself well to critiquing the undergirding 
assumptions embedded in transitional justice literature. However, I found that the 
study of hegemonic constraint in transitional justice is a burgeoning field, full of 
possibilities for deep inquiry independent of its relation to the figure of the subaltern. 
Examining the extent, shape and motivations for these specific constraints then 
became the theoretical focus of this thesis, with the subaltern a strong undertone in 
my analysis. 
Hegemony, here, will be considered in the Gramscian sense, in which a social 
group gains power through the twin forces of physical force and ‘leadership’. 
According to Douglas Lidowitz, Gramsci’s model of hegemony involves the “subtle 
dissemination of the dominant group’s perspective as universal and natural, to the 
point where the dominant beliefs and practices become and intractable component of 
common sense.” 32  For our purposes, the assumption of democratization and 
liberalization as features of ‘common sense’ can be seen as evidence of hegemony.  
I argue that the shape of transitional justice is molded by the moment it 
emerged in the international system, the post-Cold War era. Its form was distorted by 
the international context into which it was born: the dissolution of the bipolar Cold 
War political order, the triumph of the United States as the world’s remaining world 
hegemon, and the cascading wave of liberalization that crashed across the globe. 
Transitional justice was shaped by this political moment, as it absorbed important 
tenets of liberal internationalism and the need for liberal democratic states. 
Transitional justice also helped to shape this political moment, as it became a solution 
to the problem that illiberal non-democratic, conflicted states pose to the success of 
the liberal internationalist vision. Transitional justice adopts a particular posture, here, 
as a social project. It becomes hegemonic, because it is tooled in service to an 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Douglas Litowitz, “Gramsci, Hegemony, and the Law,” Brigham Young University Law Review 2, 
no. 1 (2000), 515. 
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“interlocking system of ideas which persuades people of the rightness of any given 
set of often contradictory ideas and perspectives.”33 It becomes a radical project of 
social reshaping, to suit the ends specified by its assumptions. The result is that 
considerations in transitional justice that should have merit on their own terms, 
including the ‘local,’ the ‘victim’ and indeed, justice, become instrumentalized in the 
service of this overarching liberal social project.  
The first chapter of this thesis, “Locating Transitional Justice in Historical 
Perspective,” evaluates the orthodox narrative of the emergence of transitional justice 
onto the international stage. The orthodox transitional justice origin story begins with 
the post-World War II era, and particularly focuses on the Nuremberg trials. The 
story goes that from this auspicious start, transitional justice was mired in its tracks 
by the Cold War bifurcation of the international system. By the end of the Cold War, 
there was a normative ‘justice cascade’ which was then allowed for the renewal of 
transitional justice on the world stage. This narrative, however, falls prey to several 
challenges.  
My main challenge to the transitional justice origin story is the assumption 
that the imputed significance of Nuremberg for transitional justice scholars aligns 
with the actual experience of the Nuremberg trials for contemporary actors and states. 
The ‘Nuremberg legacy’ ascribes to the Nuremberg trials an interest in diminishing 
the power of state sovereignty, when I argue the opposite was the case. I demonstrate 
that the Nuremberg trials and the Allied occupation of Germany post-WWII was 
legitimized through the active exercise of sovereignty. My critique has two 
consequences: first, it casts doubt on the veracity of the transitional justice origin 
story. But, second, it allows for the relocation of the ‘emergence’ of transitional 
justice to a more fitting place: the post-cold War moment. This places transitional 
justice discourse in dialogue with the geopolitical and ideational changes that were 
occurring at this time, and permits analysis of transitional justice alongside 
democracy promotion and liberal peacebuilding.  
“Transitional Justice: Fashioning the Liberal Democratic Polity?” is the 
second chapter of this thesis. I take “who is transitional justice meant to serve?” as the 
                                                 
33 Judith Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure, 17. 
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guiding question of this chapter, and from this perspective I consider the implications 
of embedding the objective of liberal democracy in the core of the transitional justice 
enterprise. The dominance of the democratic peace thesis in considerations of 
transitional justice is clear, there is an assumption that democratic states are 
inherently peaceful and therefore the construction of liberal democratic states in 
transitional societies is of paramount importance. I argue that this claim is 
unsubstantiated, as the democratic peace thesis makes a contested claim on the 
likelihood of violence between democratic states, rather than the intrastate conflict 
that is most likely to wrack transitional states. As a result, I argue that the democratic 
peace thesis is a faulty basis from which to begin transitional justice initiatives. 
I also consider, here, the reasons for the centrality of the democratic peace 
thesis to transitional justice. First, I argue that transitional justice’s democracy 
imperative shares troubling resonances with modernization theory, with liberal 
democracy taking the mold as the unitary form of modernity to which non-
democracies must conform. Second, I posit that the construction and expansion of 
liberal spaces is taken as a security prerogative for liberal democratic states in the 
liberal internationalist paradigm, as “liberals do not merely distrust what [non-
democracies] do; [they] dislike what they are.”34 This security dilemma is combined 
with the particular features of the moment of transitional justice’s emergence onto the 
world stage, which provided an unprecedented amount of intervention for the United 
States, the world’s premier liberal internationalist hegemon. The advent of 
transitional justice coincided with unipolar American hegemony, the ideological 
triumph of liberal internationalism in the world system, and the proliferation of liberal 
peacebuilding theory and practice. Together, this indicates that transitional justice 
practice lays a foundation for the creation and maintenance of liberal spaces across 
the world. By defining-in democracy to transitional justice enterprise, the possibility 
of alternative forms of governance is barred from the start. And yet, the rationale 
behind this democratizing imperative is fundamentally about the ontological threat 
that non-democracies pose to liberal democratic states, not the transitional states 
                                                 
34 Christopher Hobson, “‘Democracy as Civilisation,’” Global Society 22, no. 1 (2008), 85. 
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themselves. This tension, if left unresolved, points to the entanglements of transitional 
justice with hegemonic forces in the globe. 
The third chapter, “Hybridity to the Rescue?” considers transitional justice in 
relation to the rise and crisis of liberal peacebuilding and the turn to local and hybrid 
forms of peace. Transitional justice rode on the coattails of the liberal peacebuilding 
agenda, which in the early 1990s saw a rapid enlargement in funding, implementation 
and optimism. In the name of a liberal peace that would envelop the globe, 
international organizations waded into the murky waters of intrastate conflict. In the 
face of repeated failure, it seemed the hope for a liberal peace was dashed. 
After the ‘crisis’ that plagued liberal peacebuilding, to which transitional 
justice was intimately tied, there was a turn towards the ‘local’ which had a marked 
impact on transitional justice thought and practice. I argue that the turn towards the 
local was affected by two problems: the problem of knowing the local and the 
problem of local knowledge. The problem of knowing the local is the essentialized 
portrait of the ‘local’ that emerges from the instrumentalist approach that 
peacebuilding and transitional justice scholars used in relation to ‘transitional’ 
societies. Here, a binary opposition is drawn between the ‘local’ and the 
‘international,’ with problematic results. This leads to the problem of local 
knowledge, which is the process by which an artificial script and understanding of the 
‘local’ is produced that can be translated into the language of technocratic solutions. 
From this grounding, I then analyze the ways that these problematic assumptions can 
impact the interfaces at which the ‘local’ and the ‘international’ interact in transitional 
justice: hybrid tribunals and customary justice mechanisms.  Ultimately, I argue that 
hybrid attempts at transitional justice fails to escape the problematic logic of the 
liberal peace. In the name of hybridity, I argue, transitional justice assumed a new and 
more ‘legitimate’ shape.  
“Constructing the Victim, Settling Accounts” is the final chapter of this thesis. 
Finally, I consider the construction of victimhood in transitional justice, the manner in 
which the ‘victim’ is instrumentalized, and the neutralization of contesting narratives 
of victimhood through truth commissions. I attempt to deconstruct the sanitized 
dichotomy between ‘vicim’ and perpetrator’ in order to understand how these 
11 
 
 
 
narratives can obscure the messy realities of protracted conflict and depoliticize 
actors who navigate conflicted spaces. I also challenge the politics of ‘invoking the 
victim,’ or claiming the best interest of the victim to pursue certain ends. 
The process of ‘settling accounts’ through the transitional justice mechanisms 
of truth commissions can have a silencing effect on victim narratives that are left out 
of the fold. Although transitional justice aims to deal with the past, the realities of 
conflict can produce multiple, contradictory narratives of war time. The processing of 
these truths to create a singular Truth is ultimately a hegemonic act. Here, I consider 
the importance of this process to the state and nation-building project, even as it can 
come at the expense of victims. Ultimately, through authoritative appeals to the 
Truth, truth commissions can cement in place the same unjust political dynamics that 
propagated the conflict that made them necessary. 
The current shape of transitional justice is an attempt to distill diverse political 
forms into the liberal mode, to produce ready-made toolkits in response to atrocity, 
and to tacitly accept hegemonic circumstances to shape and define the transitional 
justice project. This cannot be allowed to stand. It is clear that foreclosing the search 
for justice to those options manicured and preferred by the international community is 
a sorry answer to the challenges presented after conflict ends. In this single-minded 
pursuit, transitional justice fails its emancipatory potential, which is among the most 
important assets it possesses. Critical examinations of the field, such as this one, can 
allow transitional justice to imagine itself anew.  
The methodology employed by this thesis is a discourse analytic 
methodology. Inherent to this enterprise is an understanding of the way that 
knowledge production, and its historical legacy, shapes and reshapes political 
landscapes. In this respect, I concur with the conclusion of Phillips and Hardy that 
“[w]ithout discourse, there is no social reality, and without understanding discourse, 
we cannot understand our reality, our experiences, or ourselves.” 35  Indeed, this 
understanding is crucial to our understanding of political dynamics. The creation of 
meaning, Murray Edelman argues, is “[t]he critical element in political maneuver for 
                                                 
35 Nelson Phillips and Cynthia Hardy, Discourse Analysis: Investigating Processes of Social 
Construction (London: Sage Publications, 2002), 2. 
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advantage…”36 As meaning is construction, our understanding of the precise contours 
of amorphous concepts such as ‘peace,’ ‘conflict,’ and ‘justice’ become 
instrumentalized and deployed through policy. Any attempt to understand these 
dynamics, then, must begin with the deconstruction of the concepts themselves. 
 
 
                                                 
36 Murray Edelman, “Political Language and Political Reality,” American Political Science Association 
18.1 (1985): 10. 
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Chapter 2  
 
2 Locating Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective 
An issue of central concern in the transitional justice literature is the problem of ‘the 
past,’ and how it might best be ‘reconciled,’ ‘acknowledged,’ or ‘dealt with.’ And yet, 
efforts to historicize transitional justice itself, as a coherent and bounded discipline, 
have been rather scant. There is a transitional justice ‘origin story,’ that is often taken 
at face value. As this orthodox narrative of the emergence of transitional justice is 
intimately tied to its normative aims, it is incredibly important to subject this origin 
story to scrutiny. Transitional justice literature anchors itself in seminal moments in 
the evolution of the modern state system, such as the Nuremberg trials. This origin 
story serves an important legitimizing function for the discipline, as it can then refer 
to the creation of the contemporary international system for its precedent. With 
further analysis, this orthodox narrative proves to be ahistorical in nature, as it relies 
on a revisionist interpretation of the motives and actions of states and policymakers in 
the post-World War II era. Rather than relying on this interpretation of transitional 
justice history, this chapter argues that transitional justice as a field is a much more 
recent invention, becoming a concretized field only in the immediate post-Cold War 
era. Situating transitional justice in the post-Cold War era offers the opportunity to 
analyze its emergence in conjunction with other concurrent hegemonic discourses that 
captured the international spotlight at the same moment.  
2.1 Evaluating the Transitional Justice Origin Story 
 The exact historical moment that scholars determine to be the ‘start’ of transitional 
justice is largely a function of whether they view transitional justice as a distinct 
product of the modern era, or a regularly occurring process that spans the expanse of 
time. This illuminates key differences in definitional criteria, as some definitions 
allow for transitional justice processes to be read backwards into history, while others 
root themselves in specific historical moments.  
14 
 
 
 
The boundaries of the ‘Universe of Transitional Justice’ are considerably 
broader for John Elster than for other scholars, as he defines transitional justice as 
“[t]he processes of trials, purges, and reparations that take place after the transition 
from one political regime to another.”1 Rather than understanding transitional justice 
as ‘emerging’ in a certain historically situated context, then, this definition allows 
Elster understand transitional justice as a regularly occuring fixture of moments of 
social transformation. Elster sets out to examine the ‘process of transitional justice’ at 
work in the restoration of Athenian democracy in 411 B.C. and 403 B.C., as well as 
the two French resumptions of monarchy in the 19th century.2 In doing so, Elster 
attempts to explain the ways that processes of transitional justice are different in 
transitions from one form of governance to another, largely by containing the 
normative aspects of transitional justice to the understandings of justice offered by 
incoming elites.3 
While Elster’s intended aim is to prove that “transitional justice is not limited 
to modern regimes nor to democratic regimes,” he inadvertently demonstrates one of 
the greatest challenges of the transitional justice literature: definitional ambiguity. 
Where most transitional justice scholars would contain the bounds of transitional 
justice to the latter part of the twentieth century, Elster achieves this extension of 
transitional justice by removing some of the key assumptions of much of the current 
field. By way of example, Elster does not assume that democracy is the inevitable end 
of transitional justice processes. Certainly, the coherent identification of transitional 
justice principles backwards into time forces one to reconsider the remarkability of 
our present moment. 
While Elster is a notable exception, there is an identifiable orthodox narrative 
of the emergence of transitional justice in the international arena. This origin story 
tells of a steadily evolving normative acceptance of transitional justice principles, 
occurring in successive waves over the course of the twentieth century. Ruti Teitel’s 
seminal “Transitional Justice Genealogy” is quite essential in outlining this position. 
                                                 
1 Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), i. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., 79-80. 
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Understanding this orthodox narrative of the emergence of transitional justice is 
critical to apprehending how the field of transitional justice legitimizes and 
historicizes itself and its place in the international system. This section unpacks this 
origin story, determines the reasons that this particular narrative is important to the 
field, and considers the implications of marking a new ‘start’ to the transitional justice 
project. 
Teitel describes the emergence of transitional justice as occurring in three 
distinct phases: post-World War II transitional justice, post-Cold War transitional 
justice, and steady-state transitional justice. 4  Each of these distinct ‘phases’ is 
understood to be self-contained, historically situated, and most-importantly, 
progressing. The understanding of progression implies two things: first, that 
transitional justice thought existed in a coherent way in previous iterations; and, 
second, that the most recent forms of transitional justice are the result of continuous 
and conscious assessment. Teitel repeatedly depicts each of these phases as 
constituting a critical re-appraisal of the benefits and costs of earlier models. For 
example, Teitel writes on the political transitions that occurred as a result of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, “the question confronted by successor 
regimes was whether and to what extent to adhere to the Phase I model of transitional 
justice,” demonstrating that she sees an educative effect emerging from successive 
waves of transitional justice. 5  Perhaps the most significant of these legacies, for 
Teitel, is the Nuremberg trials. 
Teitel ascribes an incredible amount of significance to the Nuremberg trials 
after the end of the Second World War. For Teitel, the particular combination of 
attributes in the immediate postwar era served as a catalyst for the emergence of 
transitional justice thought and practice.  From this standpoint, the postwar global 
arena was ripe for the emergence of transitional justice as it was characterized by the 
triumph of international law, the concurrent codification of human rights frameworks, 
and a willingness to appropriately ‘deal’ with the horrors of the Nazi regime. This 
first wave of transitional justice, post-WWII transitional justice under Teitel’s model, 
                                                 
4 Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (2003), 70. 
5 Ibid., 75. 
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was itself a repudiation of interwar justice. National justice of the interwar years was 
“displaced by international justice” in order to guarantee the rule of law.6 Collective 
sanctions, such as those imposed under the auspices of the Treaty of Versailles, were 
viewed as onerous, resulting in a “crude, undifferentiated impact” and were 
subsequently abandoned. 7  This made way for the “liberal focus on individual 
judgment and responsibility.”8  
Ultimately, and perhaps most significantly, Teitel understands the Nuremberg 
legacy to represent the emergence of an ethos of conflict resolution, a commitment to 
liberal principles in matters of justice. As Teitel writes, “[t]he postwar turn to 
international law… reflected the sense that the relevant subject of transitional justice 
was an international legal response governed by the law of conflict.” 9  The 
international community was charged with the protection of the rule of law, the rights 
of individuals, and the duty to seek justice after atrocity. This implied a limit to 
national sovereignty, and a strengthening of the role of the international in domestic 
affairs. The importance of this legacy to the orthodox transitional justice origin story 
cannot be overstated. Here, the Nuremberg trials are meant to demonstrate the 
international system curtailing the power and hegemony of the state over its citizens, 
providing the first check against state power.10 As a result, Nuremberg is seen to form 
the foundation from which transitional justice theory and practice emerged. 
According to Teitel, “by defining the rule of law in universalizing terms, it has 
become the standard by which all subsequent transitional justice debates are 
framed.”11  
Teitel is not the only scholar to ascribe a “permanent and profound 
significance” to the Nuremberg legacy.12 Minow couches her criticisms of the trials in 
the observation that “once established, the Nuremberg tribunal and even the 
‘somewhat nebulous’ notion of crimes against humanity no longer could be viewed as 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 72. 
7 Ibid., 73. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., 74. 
10 Ibid., 72. 
11 Ibid., 76. 
12 Ibid. 
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unprecedented.”13  Minow cites a Nuremberg prosecutor in saying that “the most 
important contribution of Nuremberg is the development of a kind of international 
law that grows, and is always in the process of becoming.”14 And Neil Kritz, in his 
important “Transitional Justice” volumes, also subscribes to this understanding of 
Nuremberg-as-start—although by omission. Kritz provides a chronological 
examination of transitions, yet no cases are selected for consideration that occur 
before the end of the Second World War. Of the many cases selected to represent the 
immediate postwar era, it is post-Nazism Germany that is first. This accompanies a 
note that cites the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg as a “major historical 
precedent” for future transitional justice.15 This specific reading of the centrality of 
Nuremberg is placed at the very core of the orthodox reading of the emergence and 
definition of transitional justice. 
And yet, the significance afforded to the Nuremberg trials by Teitel and others 
is based on a reading of the trials that merits further scrutiny. Perhaps one of the most 
significant imputed legacies of Nuremberg is the assessment that it encroached upon 
the heretofore-sacrosanct boundaries of national sovereignty. In the orthodox 
transitional justice narrative, national sovereignty is understood to have been an 
impenetrable force pre-World War II. The Nuremberg trials are here understood to be 
an important first challenge to this unquestioned preeminence. The opening of this 
floodgate, then, later allows transitional justice mechanisms to address state atrocity 
at the international level. As Martha Minow writes, “Nuremberg itself establishes 
such international law that takes precedence over both claims of state authority and 
claims of obligation under state law.”16 Henry T. King took the argument further, 
stating that Nuremberg “penetrated the veil of national sovereignty to recognize 
individuals as having rights independent of nation-state recognition.”17 Nuremberg, 
for many transitional justice scholars, functions as an opening salvo in a steady 
                                                 
13 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass 
Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 33. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Neil J. Kritz, ed., Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes: 
Volume 2: Country Studies (United States: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 2. 
16 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, 34. 
17 Henry King, “Nuremberg and Sovereignty,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 28, 
no. 1 (1996), 136. 
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erosion of state sovereignty which would later allow the protection and assertion of 
individual rights at the international level. 
However, the Nuremberg trials did not represent an erosion of the potency of 
state sovereignty. The four Allied Powers occupying Germany legitimized their 
jurisdiction not through an appeal to the curtailing of all states’ sovereignty 
(including their own), but by assuming control of Germany themselves and subjecting 
Germany and German citizens to their control. This is clearly illustrated in the “Law 
Reports of the Trials of War Criminals” selected and prepared by the United Nations 
War Crimes Commission in 1947. 
…[B]y the Declaration regarding the Defeat of Germany and the assumption 
of supreme authority with respect to Germany, made in Berlin on the 5th 
June, 1945(9), the four Allied Powers occupying Germany have assumed 
supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers 
possessed by the German government and any state, municipal or local 
government, or authority. The jurisdiction of the British court, sitting in the 
British Zone, could, therefore, also be based on the fact that after the 
debellatio of Germany, the Allied Powers have been the local sovereigns in 
Germany [emphasis added]. 18  
 Therefore, it was not through the desertion of national sovereignty, but 
instead, the active exercise of sovereignty, that the Allied Powers justified their 
incursion into domestic German affairs. John Laughland highlights this point by 
arguing that the main charge leveled against Nazi Germany was that of starting a war 
of aggression, which is essentially an indictment that the Nazis “violated the national 
sovereignty of other states by attacking them.” 19  Other crimes that form the 
centerpiece of modern recollections of the Nuremberg legacy, such as crimes against 
humanity, were pursued in so much as they could be couched in terms of a war of 
aggression. As Laughland argues, “Nuremberg reaffirmed the concept of national 
sovereignty as the cornerstone of the international system, and as the main legal 
bulwark against military aggression.”20   
                                                 
18 Charles Fairman and United Nations War Crimes Commission, “Law Reports of Trials of War 
Criminals. English Edition. Volume I,” California Law Review 35, no. 3 (1947), 13. 
19 John Laughland, “The Crooked Timber of Reality: Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and the Confusion of 
Rights,” Monist 90, no. 1 (2007), 13-14. 
20 Ibid., 15. 
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The transitional justice origin story, ultimately, fails under the weight of further 
scrutiny. It demonstrates that in order to conclude that Nuremberg represented the 
erosion of sovereignty when the opposite was the case, transitional justice scholars 
have had to actively reinterpret the meaning of this seminal moment in the modern 
state system. This revisionism, however, serves a functional purpose for scholars of 
transitional justice. All at once, it legitimizes their efforts, places the transitional 
justice paradigm at the fore of the international scene, and places transitional justice 
at the center of the new normative structures of the international system.  
This interpretation of the Nuremberg trials uncovers an anachronism buried at 
the heart of transitional justice that attempts to interpret meaningful moments in the 
field’s past. Transitional justice scholars fail to recognize that the primary actors at 
the inception of transitional justice history would not have described themselves as 
doing anything of the sort. According to Paige Arthur, these scholars “imput[e] ideas 
about ‘transitional justice’ to actors who… were unlikely to have held them.”21 One 
might argue that this is no more than common social science practice. Ancient 
Athenians likely did not anticipate the advent of liberal democracy although they are 
partially credited for it. Similarly, the participants in the Peace of Westphalia could 
not have anticipated the contours of the modern state when drafting their treaty. But 
this argument misses the ways that interpretations of the past shape understandings of 
the present.  
We ascribe significance to these historical moments not because of what they 
meant for the actors at the time, but because of the implications that those moments 
represent for us, the readers of that history. It is true that Nuremberg did not mean for 
the actors what it has come to meant for transitional justice scholars, and there is a 
significant distance between the interpretation of these proceedings and the reality of 
the trials. But the analysis must not stop there. It important to assess how this reading 
of the Nuremberg trials shaped the eventual emergence of transitional justice, and 
how interpreting Nuremberg in this way forwards the normative aims of the 
transitional justice project. 
                                                 
21 Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional 
Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009), 328. 
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It serves a functional purpose for transitional justice scholars to begin the 
story of transitional justice with such an auspicious start. Jonathan Friedman makes 
an important link between the inscription of history and the formation of identity. As 
Friedman argues, “the discourse of history as well as of myth is simultaneously a 
discourse of identity.”22 The construction of identity is formed through the discourse 
of history, as “it consists of attributing a meaningful past to a structured present.”23 
Here, the Nuremberg trials stand as a meaningful past, while transitional justice 
becomes the structured present that requires explanation and legitimization. As 
Friedman continues, 
If history is largely mythical, it is because the politics of identity consists in 
anchoring the present in a viable past. The past is thus, constructed 
according to the conditions and desires of those who produce historical texts 
in the present [emphasis added].24 
 
Thus, transitional justice literature seeks to anchor itself in the Nuremberg 
legacy in order to legitimize itself through that association. The Nuremberg trials 
occurred during a time period that can be rightly characterized as the inception of the 
modern international state system. Anchoring the inception of transitional justice to 
Nuremberg serves to legitimize transitional justice theory and practice, such that it 
becomes an ever-present aspect of the international community, a natural evolution 
from the atrocities of the past. It serves as a referent for the social project of 
transitional justice, legitimizing the specific visions of the role of the individual and 
the international in relation to the state.  
Thus, even as this reading of Nuremberg is removed from the complex legal 
proceedings that bear its name, its importance lies in the significance attributed to it 
by transitional justice scholars, and its role in legitimizing the transitional justice 
project. This is where the notion of ‘progress’ in Teitel’s three-phase model becomes 
incredibly salient. Even if the Nuremberg trials did not contemporarily represent the 
curtailing of state sovereignty, the assertion by transitional justice scholars that it did 
has had a marked impact on transitional justice theorizing from that moment onward. 
                                                 
22 Jonathan Friedman, “Myth, History, and Political Identity,” Cultural Anthropology 7, no. 2 (1992), 
194. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 207. 
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As Stéphane Leman-Langlois argues, this specific reading of Nuremberg was utilized 
to shape further discussions on transitional justice processes moving forward.25 It 
formed the background of conversations regarding “justice after atrocity,” and 
moving on from autocratic regimes. The Nuremberg model was thereafter both 
revered for its role as a ‘fair trial’ and invoked as an image for “possible perils 
embodied by conventional justice.”26 Thus, the question of where transitional justice 
can be seen to ‘start’ is of more than just a passing significance. The transitional 
justice origin story, flawed as it may be, has an active, purposeful effect on 
transitional justice understandings of the present and future. 
The hallmarks of contemporary transitional justice thought and practice gain 
coherence in the post-Cold War moment. Indeed, as Paige Arthur argues, it is 
significant that this is the moment in which the term ‘transitional justice’ is coined. 
“The appearance and apparent acceptance of the phrase ‘transitional justice’ is… a 
response to a set of new problems and a means of legitimating the practices used to 
respond to those problems.” 27  These ‘problems’ that made the emergence of 
transitional justice necessary are particular to the post-Cold War historical moment. It 
is informed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the political 
distortions wrought by the bipolar balance of power. It is also a response to the 
triumph of the ideological persuasion of the world’s remaining superpower, the 
United States. A wave of liberalization took hold across the regions that had 
previously constituted the spheres of influence of the global superpowers. Thus, 
transitional justice is intimately tied to the international arena in which it emerged. 
This is important because it further removes us from the transitional justice origin 
story, but also because it allows us to place transitional justice in a new international 
context, in dialogue with different prevailing discourses.   
Transitional justice was conceived in the post-Cold War era, but it also gained 
immense political traction upon its arrival. This is evidenced by the incredible 
expansion of scope and breadth of transitional justice literature at the end of the 
                                                 
25 Stephane Leman-Langlois, “Constructing a Common Language: The Function of Nuremberg in the 
Problematization of Postapartheid Justice,” Law and Social Inquiry 27, no. 1 (2002), 79-99. Ruti 
Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 76. 
26 Stephane Leman-Langlois, “Constructing a Common Language,” 80. 
27 Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights,” 329. 
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twentieth century. Teitel notes that transitional justice became more comprehensive in 
scope, as it “became associated with the more complex and diverse political 
conditions of nation-building.” 28  Tensions between amnesty and accountability 
became pronounced in this phase, conceived as a contrast between the relative 
primacy of truth or justice. Thus, the latitude of the project was expanded: it moved 
away from offering judgment in particular individual legal cases to revisiting and 
rewriting the past.29 If it is here that structural reconstitution of society became the 
intended aim of the transitional justice project, perhaps this is a better place to ‘begin’ 
the transitional justice narrative.  
Indeed, the normative frameworks that are associated with transitional justice 
also come into being in the post-Cold War era. As Teitel argues, “the problem of 
transitional justice was reconceived across moral and psychological lines to redefine 
identity.”30 The mechanisms of transitional justice, meant to bring these normative 
visions into being, begin to take root at that time as well. Of these mechanisms, Teitel 
states, “these politics became the signs of an age of restoration of the rule of law in a 
global politics.” 31  In the post-Cold War moment, the language of forgiveness, 
reconciliation and acknowledgement were joined to one another, and the project of 
‘transition’ defined.  
Paige Arthur makes a compelling case that transitional justice emerged from a 
crisis in the human rights community. Without repressive governments to “name and 
shame,” Arthur argues, the end of autocracy across much of the globe forecast the 
“los[s] of its central raison d’être”.32 As a result, transitional justice language was 
mobilized to fill in the gaps, and to retool the existing human rights frameworks into 
blueprints for transition.  Arthur places an emphasis on transition as a concept in this 
emerging discourse, and its appropriation form Marxist understandings of social 
transformation to “technocratic approaches to engineering political change.”33 The 
endpoint of liberal democracy was integrated early and thoroughly, such that the 
                                                 
28 Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 77. 
29 Ibid., 82. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 84. 
32 Ibid., 335. 
33 Ibid., 338-339. 
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normative goals of transitional justice lose coherence without its inclusion. Consider, 
for example, the introduction to Neil Kritz’s edited collection Transitional Justice, 
which argues from the outset that that the rule of law constituted a “crucial 
component of both scholarship and practice in peacemaking and peacebuilding,” and 
that rule of law was best achieved through democracy.34 Thus, it was in this period 
that transitional justice as we have come to know it takes shape. The mechanisms that 
we associate with transitional justice have been around for centuries, but the social 
project of transitional justice relies on the emergence of post-Cold War discourses for 
coherence. Indeed, 
it is only recently that they have been justified through appeals to universal 
norms such as human rights, or that they have been seen as legitimate only 
when undertaken by a democratic polity, or that they have been seen as 
having an underlying, determined connection related to the normative goal of 
promoting democracy.35  
 
The orthodox transitional justice history is told as an unfolding progress, in 
fits and starts. A promising post-WWII era was frustrated by the advent of the Cold 
War. The end of the Cold War coincided with a normative appreciation for human 
rights and accountability, brought on by a ‘justice cascade’ that captured the 
international scene. 36  However, for this narrative to hold, one must actively 
reinterpret the meanings and significances of seminal moments in transitional justice 
history, such as the Nuremberg tribunals. If one does away with this orthodox view, 
however, one can more clearly view the political dynamics that led to the emergence 
of transitional justice, and the form that it assumed upon arrival. 
Ultimately, the contours and boundaries of transitional justice were molded by 
the liberal internationalist global system into which it emerged. At the level of 
abstraction at which much of transitional justice theorizing occurs, the literature can 
be “ahistorical or decontextualized,” frequently treating concepts such as truth, 
                                                 
34 Neil J. Kritz, ed., Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes: 
Volume 1: General Considerations (United States: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), xv. 
35 Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights,” 334. 
36 Kathryn Sikkink, “The Justice Cascade: The Origins and Effectiveness of Prosecutions of Human 
Rights Violations,” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 9, no. 1 (2013), 97. 
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justice, peace as “abstract and universal principles.”37 However, in order for these 
abstract and universal concepts to gain currency, they rely on the existence of pre-
existing discourses for comprehension and legitimation. This is why it is important to 
reassess the origins of transitional justice, and to critically evaluate the origin story of 
the discipline. To really apprehend the discursive precursors that influenced the 
discipline that we now call transitional justice, one must have an appreciation of the 
discourses that rendered it salient. Locating transitional justice in the post-Cold War 
era allows one to appreciate the important corollaries to other discourses that served 
as intellectual precursors to transitional justice theory and practice, such as 
modernization theory, democracy promotion and liberal peacebuilding. These 
relationships will be explored at length in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.
                                                 
37 Laurel E. Fletcher, Harvey M. Weinstein, and Jamie Rowen, “Context, Timing and the Dynamics of 
Transitional Justice: A Historical Perspective,” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 1 (2009), 208. 
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Chapter 3  
3 Transitional Justice: Fashioning the Liberal 
Democratic Polity? 
The ideological triumph of liberalism in the international system is all but 
uncontested. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent ‘third wave’ 
of democratization, liberal democracy has emerged on the world stage as the 
“preeminently acceptable form of governance.” 1  As a result, transitional justice 
literature has entrenched the ‘universal value’ of liberal democracy at the very core of 
its endeavor. In fact, the liberalizing aims of the transitional justice project have been 
folded into the very definition of the subject. When Olsen, Payne and Reiter set out to 
define transitional justice as a field, they remarked that the twin aims of the enterprise 
were to “reduce human rights violations and strengthen democracy.” 2  Indeed, 
transitional societies have been characterized as “emerging democracies” at least 
since the publications of Neil Kritz’s edited volumes, which constitute amongst the 
first coherent utterances of Transitional Justice as a coherent and discrete discipline.3 
This chapter argues that the assumption of the end-point of liberal democracy 
in the transitional justice literature has deeply politicized the field, tying the field to 
the geopolitical, security, and socio-political aims of reigning hegemons. As a result, 
transitional justice is divested of its emancipatory aims, and is reduced to a mere 
technocratic approach favored by American and Western policymakers to bring about 
the proliferation of liberal spaces. Democracy promotion, here, means more than just 
the introduction of regular elections, although the transformation of political 
institutions is an important feature of transitional justice efforts. The transplantation 
of a ‘civic culture,’ replete with liberal values of tolerance, equality and participation 
are also embedded in this framework.  
                                                 
1 Amartya Kumar Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” Journal of Democracy 10, no. 3 (1999), 4. 
2 Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter, “The Justice Balance: When Transitional 
Justice Improves Human Rights and Democracy,” Human Rights Quarterly 32, no. 4 (2010), 980. 
3 Neil J. Kritz, Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes: 
Volume 1:General Considerations (United States: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995). 
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 Taken as a whole, transitional justice literature takes the fittingness of liberal 
democracy in transitional societies as a given. The end goal of any transition, as 
dictated by the literature, is liberal democracy. This has numerous effects on 
transitional justice as a whole. First, it fixes transitional justice in contentious and 
paradigmatically partisan debates on the value, promotion and practice of democracy. 
Second, it uncomfortably aligns transitional justice with the hegemonic aims of 
American foreign policy. Third, it bounds the possible universe of emerging forms of 
statehood post-‘transition’. Finally, it convolutes the aims of transitional justice that 
are intended to have value on their own, such as reconciliation and forgiveness, into 
means towards the end of democracy promotion and consolidation.  
3.1 Transitional Justice and the Democratic Peace 
When the United States Institute of Peace set out to complete a volume of works that 
would become the conceptual framework for the field of transitional justice, the 
tomes were suggestively titled Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies 
Reckon with Former Regimes. To justify this framing, the editors argue that “although 
in practice imperfect, democracy is by nature peaceful: on the international plane, 
democracies generally do not wage war against each other [emphasis added].”4 The 
democratic peace thesis, then, is invoked in order to justify the centrality of 
democracy to the transitional justice enterprise. The following section considers the 
democratic peace thesis, with an eye to examining its relation to transitional justice as 
a whole. 
Current articulations of the democratic peace thesis find their philosophical 
precursor in the work of Immanuel Kant, and this idea is particularly articulated in 
Perpetual Peace. The current formulation of the democratic peace thesis is that there 
is a causal relationship between democracy and peace. As the argument goes, liberal-
democratic states do not fight one another, even if they may be warring with non-
liberal democratic states. Thus, a “zone of peace” exists among states that are liberal-
democratic in nature, and conversely, that a threatening “zone of war” in states that 
are not. As the democratic peace thesis becomes enmeshed in ‘policy relevant’ 
                                                 
4 Ibid., xv. 
27 
 
 
 
technocratic language, “the prescription for more peaceful inter-state relations, then, 
is to ‘just add liberal democracy.”5  
The democratic peace thesis therefore acts as a barometer by which the 
domestic affairs of states can be normatively evaluated. States that conform to the 
liberal democratic ideal are considered ‘peaceful,’ whereas those that do not are 
considered to be possible threats to international security. As Christopher Hobson 
argues, “democracy has taken on the conceptual characteristics of “civilization”, 
associated with notions of progress, development, modernisation and a host of other 
laudable traits.”6 As an emerging standard of civilization, Hobson argues, states are 
hierarchically rated on the basis of their ‘democraticness,’ which determines the 
limits of international society as well as determining relations with those on the 
outskirts.7 This normatively laden standard “differentiates, evaluates, includes and 
excludes... Those barbarians beyond [the bounds of civilization], however, are judged 
and condemned as inferior, backwards and, often, dangerous.”8  
This last point deserves elaboration. Reading the world as constituted by two 
diametrically opposed world orders composed of a democratic “zone of peace” and 
the non-democratic “zone of war” creates a security dilemma whereby the outright 
elimination of non-liberal orders becomes not only possible, but necessary for the 
preservation for international peace and stability.9 Thus, the seeds of bellicosity and 
intervention are written into the philosophical underpinning of liberal 
internationalism. As Linda S. Bishai argues, “intervention occurs both as a result of 
the denial of status for so-called non-liberal states and as a result of the lowered bar 
for military intervention by liberal states threatened by the refusal of non-members to 
                                                 
5 Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, “The International Relations of Democracy, Liberalism and War,” 
in Democracy, Liberalism and War: Rethinking the Democratic Peace Debate, ed. Tarak Barkawi and 
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join the liberal club…” 10  According to Hobson, the very existence of non-
democracies constitutes a threat to liberal democracies for two reasons. First, there is 
the “behavioral threat” of failed states and rogue states that prevents the expansion of 
the zone of peace. There is also, however, an “ontological threat” of non-democracies 
as “liberals do not merely distrust what they do; [they] dislike what they are.”11 Thus, 
non-democracies are understood to constitute a threat to non-democracies. The 
promotion and proliferation of democracy, then, becomes a matter of existential 
concern. 
This has very significant bearings on transitional justice. The wrongs 
committed by previous regimes are often framed in liberal language that centers 
individual human rights in opposition to state-sponsored authoritarianism. As well, 
the challenges of that past that require acknowledgement and redress are often 
understood to be problems wrought by insufficient liberalization. Transitional 
societies, according to Juan E. Méndez, “have to reckon with the legacy of human 
rights violations left by the recent authoritarian past. They all share this common 
feature…”12  Neil Kritz also has something to offer on this account: 
People had been ruled on a daily basis by violence, terror, and 
division…civil trust had been impossible, economic opportunity crushed, 
and congenial relations hard. With democracy in the air, there were 
penetrating cries for retaliation against old rules and for revelations about the 
past.13  
 
Thus, it is the lack of democracy that is diagnosed as the main challenge, the 
main impediment that transitional states have to overcome. This attempts to draw 
from elements of the democratic peace thesis, in that the inherent peacefulness of 
democracies could offer “rule of law” domestically to citizens. It is not just that 
democracy is an end goal for transitional societies, but also that illiberality is 
understood to have been a causal factor of the challenges a transitional society faces. 
Against this backdrop, it is clear that if a lack of democratic principles and liberality 
created these problems, only democracy can offer refuge.  
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And yet, this reading stretches the democratic peace thesis to its conceptual 
breaking point. As mentioned earlier, Kritz considers democratic states to be 
“inherently peaceful,” but this claim is invalidated by the very thesis he invokes. The 
democratic peace thesis makes a claim about the likelihood of democratic states to 
fight other democratic states. It makes no claim whatsoever to preventing intrastate 
conflict. Invoking the democratic peace thesis in this way obscures the actual nature 
of conflicts in ‘transitional’ societies, and overlays normative prescriptions with little 
justification, other than the paradigmatic predilections of the transitional justice 
community.  
There is also a significant pedagogical element to transitional justice’s 
approach to democracy, which solidifies existing international hierarchies. As Teivo 
Teivainen argues, democracy promotion “assumes the social function of the teacher 
whose role is to instruct and guide the more child-like countries towards the path of 
development.”14 This is also borne out in transitional justice works on democracy. For 
example, Charles Duryea Smith makes the case that in the aftermath of the 
dissolution of the communist world, emerging democracies “looked to the 
democracies, especially the United States, for help in creating democratic institutions 
and the complex foundation of a citizenry of democrats so necessary to traverse the 
rough waters ahead.”15 Smith continues, “How, they asked, might we best inspire our 
people with the habits of democracy and establish legal institutions and protect our 
new freedoms?”16  
The pedagogical inference of this statement is clear. Pursuant to the requests 
of the newly ‘emerging democracies’ of the world, established democracies were 
invited to instruct newly democratic nations on the creation and maintenance of 
democratic institutions and citizenry. Indeed, the pedagogical impulse of the books 
also extends to the intended audience and use of the volumes themselves. As noted by 
the then-President of the United States Institute of Peace, their seminal volume of 
collected and curated wisdom was meant to serve as “a standard reference for 
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governments, private organizations, [and] scholars” in order to “provide insights and 
examples for leaders in emerging democracies as they confront the challenges of 
transitional justice.” 17  Clearly, here, it is the role of established democracies to 
demonstrate the ‘right way’ of performing democracy, for the benefit of emerging 
democracies.  
In some cases, the power hierarchies embedded in the teacher-student 
relationship are lauded. In “Promoting Democracy by Example,” Loch K. Johnson 
makes the patronizing case that, 
studies examining how best to teach children to read uniformly conclude that 
the most effective method is for children to see their parents reading… In a 
similar sense, America’s democracy as often served as an example for other 
nations, since the power of culture and moral suasion combine to make the 
United States a showcase for those who aspire to modernize and 
democratize.18  
 
Reinforcing existing hierarchies through this teacher-student, or even parent-
child relationship is deeply problematic and disempowering for ‘transitional’ 
communities, as it relies upon understandings of their inferiority and backwardness. 
As the following section will show, the current democracy promotion frenzy lends 
borrows heavily from the legacy of modernization theory, which itself rested on the 
premise of a racialized international hierarchy of development.  
3.2 Modernization Theory and Democracy Promotion 
Democracy promotion has emerged onto the world stage with a significant force since 
the fall of the Berlin Wall incited the famed “third wave of democratization.”19 And 
yet, this model borrows quite heavily from the universalizing models of human 
development that emerged in the twentieth century: modernization theory. Indeed, 
modernization theory, democracy promotion, and, now, transitional justice, have 
charted similar paths in their emerging trajectories. Modernization theory, just like 
contemporary democracy promotion, emerged from the social sciences and found 
adherents in American foreign policy circles. Through this migration, normative 
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theoretical concepts were converted into technocratic language that was 
instrumentalized through American foreign policy. This section will consider the rise 
of modernization theory, its legacy for contemporary democracy promotion, and the 
underlying assumptions that transitional justice has subsequently absorbed.  
Modernization theory posits that societies progress through distinct stages of 
socio-economic development. In the case of Walt Whitman Rostow’s seminal Stages 
of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, he outlines five stages—
beginning with a ‘traditional society,’ through to a ‘Take-Off’, and concluding with a 
drive towards modernity and an age of mass-consumption. 20  The process of 
‘development,’ was articulated thereafter as an attempt to encourage 
‘underdeveloped’ states into ‘Take-Off’ so that they may join the international 
community in enjoying the fruits of modernity. The end-goal of modernity was 
ascribed the quality of a ‘standard of civilization,’ or, “the entry ticket to the 
community of free and independent nations.” 21  Modernization theory was as 
simplistic as it was prescriptive, constructing a single model of modernity from the 
example of a handful of states, and attempting to export the model wholesale to the 
Global South. 22  And the realization of modernity, it seemed, required allowing 
Western states incredible amounts of penetration in internal affairs, as well as a 
requisite free-market economy.  
Fueled by a need to comprehend, and thus contain, rapidly shifting 
circumstances in the international arena, the social sciences have long offered 
technocratic solutions to emerging challenges. There are several legacies that 
modernization theory has lent to transitional justice. The first legacy is the manner in 
which social science literature unabashedly served the political ends of American 
policymakers during the Cold War. Here, normative considerations were so immersed 
within the modernization theory literature that these assumptions were uncontested, 
and social science knowledge production was tooled toward providing pragmatic 
frameworks towards the ends specified by American foreign policy. Second, 
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understandings of progress were held as a ‘standard of civilization’ which 
decolonizing states were meant to meet in order to be fully fledged members of the 
‘international community.’ Finally, the threshold of international legitimacy, 
inclusion into the ‘international community’ and indeed, eligibility for sovereignty 
was predicated on meeting particular criteria. These aspects are integral to 
understanding the hegemonic tendencies in contemporary democracy promotion in 
general, and in transitional justice in particular. While there are noticeable 
distinctions, these are distinctions of degree, rather than of kind. 
The Cold War served as a “mobilizer of purpose” for American social 
scientists. As Michael E. Latham argues, the bifurcated world system brought the 
political dimensions of knowledge to the fore. According to Latham, the Cold War 
constituted a “force that shaped [social scientists’] sense of themselves as producers 
of knowledge and as part of the guardian class for liberal democracy.”23 Thus, the 
political implications and repercussions of their readings of political circumstances 
were not hidden, but extolled. The disruptive and potentially dangerous challenges 
presented by the decolonization of the ‘underdeveloped’ world, combined with the 
looming threat of communist incursion motivated social scientists to produce “policy-
relevant conclusions,” intimately linking “professional responsibility and patriotic 
service to the state.” 24  As well, American policymakers keenly anticipated these 
intellectual developments. The eventual emergence and domination of modernization 
theory was finely calibrated to the environment in which it was conceived. As Nicolas 
Guilhot argues, modernization theory acted as an ‘academic product,’ which 
describes the “subordination of the field of the social sciences to the field of 
[American] state power.”25 This means that the tools of knowledge production were 
formulated by social scientists for consumption by American foreign policymakers, 
adopting and shaping the policy agenda through the lens of the security climate of the 
day. This fundamentally politicizes the substance of the knowledge that is produced, 
and allows the incursion of American hegemonic interest in the academic arena. 
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There is a relevant parallel here between the securitization of communist 
states under the Cold War calculus with the securitization of non-liberal democracies 
in the logic of the Global War on Terror. Under the Cold War logic, a fear of the rival 
order of communism required containment, and, a “non-communist manifesto” was 
the policy-oriented answer. In the post-Cold War era it was rogue states, failed states 
and terrorism that captured the anxieties of policymakers. Ostensibly driven by social 
ills including a lack of democracy, forceful intervention in sovereign territories and 
the promotion of democracy became necessary. Democracy promotion became the 
‘academic product’ suited to fit the job.  
Guilhot considers the shift from modernization theory to the new doctrinal 
paradigm of democratization to be an example of “continuity within change.”26 Even 
as policymakers in the Cold War era found the concept of democratization to be 
momentarily out of reach of ‘underdeveloped’ states until they became 
socioeconomically and politically mature, democracy was considered to be an 
attribute of modernity.27 By the 1980s, scholars who challenged modernization theory 
were at the forefront for the new theorizing of democratization. They argued that it 
was modernization theorists who allowed authoritarian states to discard 
democratization in favor of economic growth. 28  Indeed, many of these theorists 
ironically derided modernization theorists as “‘social engineers’ who offered their 
expertise on the assumption that economic modernization will foster democracy.”29 
Instead, it seemed, they preferred to be surrounded by social engineers who offered 
their expertise on the assumption that democracy would foster perpetual peace. In any 
case, by the time that the Soviet system crumbled and the third wave of 
democratization was underway, it seemed, democratization literature was already 
undergoing an explosion.  
 Paige Arthur notes the move away from structuralism and grand-theorizing in 
this era, and towards “technocratic approaches to engineering political change 
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[emphasis added].”30 The particular language of ‘stages’ was ejected, as was the 
particular socioeconomic focus – states could be expected to modernize through elite 
bargaining, institutions of the legal system, as well as efforts to constitute liberal 
subjects.31 This is a matter of procedure and pacing, rather than a re-evaluation of the 
problematic core of modernization theory. As Guilhot writes,  
[s]evering the link between democratization and more encompassing 
conceptions of social change, the literature on “transitions” to democracy 
that they produced rested on a conception of negotiated, orderly and, 
ultimately, manageable political change, kept distinct and separate from 
socioeconomic transformations. 32  
 
One important intellectual legacy that transitional justice draws from 
modernization theory is the singular vision of modernity: a universal modernity 
designed by Western states and transplanted onto states in the Global South. As Tarak 
Barkawi argues, “[t]he bifurcated division of the world found in the [democratic 
peace] debates reproduces older discourses of North-South relations: the claim that 
there is a democratic peace rests on a Eurocentric conception of modernity.”33 Uday 
Chandra makes the point further, arguing that the Cold War distinction between 
“modern Western and traditional postcolonial societies… mapped onto an older 
binary between colonizer and colonized” and that these racialized influenced continue 
to hold an unfortunate credence. 34  “Modernity and democracy were 
unproblematically regarded as the province of the West. The postcolonial world was 
imagined as its Other: rooted in the traditions of the past, socially and economically 
backward, and unfriendly to representative democracy.”35 Thus, hierarchies in the 
international arena are reproduced through goal-setting practices, and the bounding of 
possible outcomes in the international system.  
                                                 
30 Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional 
Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009), 339. 
31 Ibid., 338. 
32 Nicholas Guilholt, The Democracy Makers, 135. 
33 Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, “The International Relations of Democracy, Liberalism and War,” 
4. 
34 Uday Chandra, “The Case for a Postcolonial Approach to the Study of Politics,” New Political 
Science 35, no. 3 (2013). 
35 Ibid., 485. 
35 
 
 
 
Another parallel between modernization theory and democracy promotion is 
the emphasis on progress, a liberal vision of socioeconomic or sociopolitical 
evolution. In modernization theory, this is demonstrated by the idea that 
‘underdeveloped’ states somehow resembled industrialized states in earlier stages of 
formation. A similar language is used to describe ‘emerging democracies,’ even if the 
overt references have been tempered due to criticisms of modernization. The 
discourse of democratization contains, within it, an implicit premise that western-
style liberal democracy is the end stage of political maturity. This is manifest through 
the language of the insufficient ‘consolidation’ of certain democracies, censuring 
states for the lack of the rule of law or civil society—all implicitly using western-style 
statehood as a standard of civilization. 
This concept of progressive evolution adds another dimension to the binary 
opposition between the democratic zone of peace and the illiberal zone of war. For 
the zone of war, the zone of peace is meant to represent the possible outcome—
conforming with the demands of homogeneity imposed externally ostensibly allows 
states in the Global South to join the elite upper echelons of statehood. For the zone 
of peace, the zone of war represents a lawless barbarism—a disorder that needs to be 
dramatically reconstituted internally, or reckoned with, with force. These discourses 
are grafted temporally onto a linear vision of human evolution of development. Those 
at the lower end of the developmental totem pole are meant to aspire to the highest 
reaches, exemplified by the zone of peace. This pedagogical aspect of this binary 
opposition demonstrates the hierarchical relationship between the zone of peace and 
zone of war. As Barkawi argues, “the zone of peace shows to the zone of war its 
future—if it embraces liberal democracy—whereas the zone of war shows to the zone 
of peace its own recent past.36 Only with political and economic liberalization, the 
argument goes, can a ‘transitional’ state be admitted into the zone of peace and 
prosperity. 37  As I will now demonstrate, this fundamentally bounds the possible 
outcomes of state formation in ‘transitional’ states. 
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For all of the language of “freedom” touted by promoters of liberal 
democracy, citizens of ‘transitional’ societies are decidedly not free in their choice of 
possible state formation. The restriction does not only exclude non-democratic forms 
of governance, but even democratic forms of governance that are not grounded in the 
liberal tradition. A “narrow and settled conception of democracy” is upheld, based 
primarily on procedural definition that privileges civil and political rights above 
economic and social needs. 38  According to Barkawi, this ascendant “hegemonic 
liberalism ‘defines out’ other historically valid democratic claims,” meaning that 
there is a fundamental intolerance even for other forms of democratic expression.39 
Thus, the tightly dictated ends of the goal of ‘transition’ are bound ever tighter, and 
failure to pass this standard of civilization is enough to exclude a state from 
‘international society,’ as well as inviting possible political and military intervention. 
3.3 Constructing Liberal Spaces through Transitional 
Justice 
I have argued above that transitional justice has tightly bound itself to a problematic 
and challenging discourse of democratization. However, I want to argue that 
transitional justice has so enmeshed itself into this discourse that contemporary 
transitional justice acts as a democracy promotion practice. That is to say, rather than 
democracy simply being an important feature of transitional justice, instead, 
transitional justice has become the handmaiden to the liberal project of homogeneity: 
creating liberal spaces and liberal citizens in order to colonize the furthest reaches of 
the globe with a “zone of peace.”  
 The language of transitional justice subordinates its goals to a wider project of 
democratization; it makes the goals of transitional justice intelligible without 
reference to democracy and democracy promotion. In this sense, transitional justice 
becomes a how-to manual for the moment of ‘transition’—from current disorder to 
democratic harmony. In many texts, the value of transitional justice is justified while 
the implicit end-point of democracy is not, implying that the value of transitional 
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justice lies in its ability to create better democracies. For example, Olsen, Payne and 
Reiter set out to prove that transitional justice achieves a ‘justice balance,’ improving 
human rights and democracy. They identified the problem as follows: 
[Heretofore,] Scholars and policymakers have little systematic evidence to 
support the claim that transitional justice actually brings improvements in 
human rights and democracy. Second, if transitional justice does achieve its 
goals, neither scholars nor policy-makers clarify when, why, or how it might 
do so.40  
 
 There are two revealing statements embedded in this text. First, Olsen et al. 
implicitly identify human rights and democracy as the goals of transitional justice by 
using “democracy” and the “goals of transitional justice” interchangeably in the text. 
Second, it is clear that scholars require evidence to substantiate earlier claims about 
the value of transitional justice for human rights and democracy—demonstrating that 
transitional justice was justified not for its own sake, but at least sometimes in the 
name of human rights and democracy. This means that transitional justice is a means 
to the end of human rights abuse and non-democracy, and not necessarily an end 
itself.  
 This framing is all too common in transitional justice literature. Juan E. 
Méndez identifies that the “the pursuit of retrospective justice is an urgent task of 
democratization,” as the pursuit of transitional justice “highlights the mental character 
of the new order to be established, an order based on the rule of law and on respect 
for the dignity and worth of each human person.41 Again, we see transitional justice 
invoked as a technocratic means to the end of democracy. Transitional justice then 
becomes embedded as a democracy promotion practice: a means to the end of 
democracy. 
 The consequence of situating transitional justice within the remit of 
democracy promotion is embedding transitional justice within hegemonic practices of 
ordering the globe. Democracy promotion is currently at the fore of the international 
agenda and it is heavily supported by the globe’s reigning hegemon, the United 
States. Moving from the earlier discussion on the production of ‘policy-relevant’ 
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knowledge in social science communities, I want to deal here specifically with the 
application of that knowledge. As the seeds of interventionism are buried in liberal 
internationalist prescriptions, and as the democratic peace thesis justifies ordering the 
world in “zones of peace” and “zones of war,” the practical consequence is the 
creation of a democracy/security nexus. As Laura Zanotti argues, “liberal democracy 
became a technology of international government of insecurity.”42 This is because 
identity-based discourses of danger permeate considerations of the insufficiently 
democratic world, where “areas of instability are remapped in the form of 
‘borderlands,’ characterized by disorder, irrationality and excessive violence.43 It is 
no longer simply a conversation about the best form of organization of a state, 
instead, it is the protection of “democratic culture” against an illogical and 
threatening outside world.  
 Transitional justice becomes a manner of protection from the threat of the 
rogue hinterlands. Often, this is in the form of political intervention, ordering 
particular mechanisms for conflict resolution in the aftermath of mass atrocity and 
conflict. But it also takes the form of military intervention, as exemplified by one of 
the crowning achievements of transitional justice its short history, the doctrine of the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which requires the intervention of states in cases of 
genocide. As Mahmood Mamdani writes, “the new global regime of R2P bifurcates 
the international system between sovereign states whose citizens have political rights, 
and de facto trusteeship territories whose populations are seen as wards in need of 
external protection. [R2P allows] the legal normalization of certain types of violence 
such as Western counterinsurgency efforts, while arbitrarily criminalizing the 
violence of other states as ‘genocide’.”44  
And even when external intervention is not made primarily on transitional 
justice grounds, transitional justice can still be of use. Mark Arenhövel earnestly 
argues “after an external intervention, a coalition of states or the international 
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community will often install mechanisms for transitional justice to build a sustainable 
peace, stabilize the society, and foster democracy.” 45  Indeed, Rosemary Nagy 
demonstrates who transitional justice scholars that deal with the invasions of Iraq and 
Afghanistan under the banner of the Global War distort the narrative of ‘transition’ to 
exclude the most immediate reasons for instability. Iraq “is constructed as being 
‘from’ a repressive police state under Saddam Hussein,” and “Afghanistan is “‘from’ 
cycles of war and repression culminating in the Taliban regime.” Conveniently, this 
sidesteps the question of foreign intervention altogether, and the accountability for the 
instability is domesticated.46 Transitional justice becomes integral to the justification 
for, prosecution of, and recovery from military intervention.  
 Transitional justice also attempts to constitute the ideal liberal subjects that 
are meant to populate the emerging democracies. According to Neil Kritz, the rule of 
law ensures a system in which “citizens may enjoy trust in their institutions and 
among one another.”47 This dovetails with Christopher Hobson’s reading of the value 
of the ‘rule of law’ and ‘civil society’ for democracy promotion writ large: rule of law 
is intended to provide the procedural structures, while civil society “foster[s] liberal 
democracy from below.”48 Fostering liberal democracy from below is an attempt to 
transplant civic culture to the grassroots level, which is accomplished through the use 
of transitional justice mechanisms.49 There is a corresponding economic argument 
forwarded by liberals, which addresses the value of liberal democracy for society as a 
whole. Because liberal democracy makes few demands on its citizens, Patrick Deneen 
argues, “it frees them to pursue private interests and to cultivate personal talents that 
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contribute to great and growing prosperity across the society at large.”50 The social 
and individual value of fostering the liberal subject, then, is multifaceted.  
Cultivating the liberal subject also serves to solve the basest level of the 
security dilemma posed by illiberal states. Laura Zanotti argues that “liberal 
conceptions posit that security can be best attained by creating conditions under 
which reasonable individuals can exercise liberties.”51 Thus, liberal subjects ensure 
the security of the whole by being “simultaneously ‘disciplined’ and ‘active’ in 
society.”52 The argument is that when democratic values such as toleration, respect 
and the rule of law are deeply rooted among the populace the likelihood of violent 
conflict will decrease. This means that democracy promotion endeavors curtail not 
only the possible universe of state formations, but also the types of citizens meant to 
inhabit these states. 
3.4 Fashioning the Liberal Democratic Polity?  
In the eyes of those who support transitional justice, democracy acts as a silver bullet. 
All at once it is intended to ameliorate the social conflicts of the past, construct a 
vibrant and participatory citizenry in the present, and pave the way for meaningful 
engagement in the international community in the future. However, all of these hopes 
are constructed atop a rationale for democratization that has little to do with the 
particular society in question and everything to do with the preservation of stability 
and order in the international system.  
For all of the emancipatory language surrounding democracy promotion, it is 
guided neither by the conflicted society in question nor with the particular society in 
mind. The outcome of transitional justice processes in ‘transitional’ societies is pre-
ordained. Liberal democracy and a market economy become the default end-goal of 
the transitional justice process. This severely circumscribes the possible outcomes of 
transitional justice processes, as it limits the possible outcomes of state formations in 
‘transitional’ states.  
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The implication of transitional justice as democracy promotion practice 
extends beyond its use as a vehicle for the political homogenization of the globe. It 
challenges the emancipatory ideals upon which transitional justice girds itself. In the 
field’s current state, the answer to all forms of mass violence comes in the form of a 
limited number of external prescriptions. Those prescriptions have the possibility of 
circumscribing avenues of justice and reconciliation that are most relevant for the 
communities in question. Instead, what is offered is a sweeping project of social 
engineering, meant to curtail the ontological threat of that state to others. The radical 
nature of the transitional justice project is, here, taken for granted. Often, it entails 
upending the political, social, and often economic structures of a society. And yet, the 
needs and desires of the ‘transitional’ society, the focus of so much rhetorical 
commitment and dedication, fades into the background when considering the 
democratic peace thesis.  
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Chapter 4  
4 Hybridity to the Rescue? 
 Even as liberalism has emerged triumphant in the international system, a stark reality 
has dampened the hopes of a liberal peace enveloping all corners of the planet. 
Intractable violent conflict, a lack of ‘consolidation’ of democratic institutions, and a 
growing chorus of critics has humbled proponents of the liberal peacebuilding 
paradigm. Hybridity is meant to be a solution to this challenge.  A search for 
alternatives to this paradigm has led to the ascendance of localized initiatives in the 
areas of peacebuilding, state-building and transitional justice. This has meant an 
emphasis on customary peace and justice practices, the hybridization of liberal and 
illiberal processes and practices, and an emphasis on local ownership of peace 
processes. The underlying thrust of these approaches is an emphasis on ‘legitimacy,’ 
which is understood to exist in the domain of the local. This chapter argues that many 
hybrid approaches to peacebuilding and justice share the same problematic 
assumptions of liberal peacebuilding, and constitute a shift in procedure rather than a 
wholesale reassessment of the challenge at hand. As a result, emphasis on hybridity 
tends to “flatten out and even lose a clear sense of the coordinates of power relations 
within and between global, national, and local orders.”1 Hybridity, this section argues, 
does not escape the underlying logic of the liberal peace. 
4.1 Faith, Frustration and Failure: Liberal Peacebuilding 
in Crisis 
Although attempts to precisely define the liberal peace fall prey to its diffuse and 
ambiguous nature, it has a long philosophical precedent, stretching back to Immanuel 
Kant’s Perpetual Peace. 2  It is constituted by an ideological commitment to 
marketization and democratization, but either or both of these elements can be 
privileged at a particular time. Messy constellations of hegemonic states in the Global 
North, international organizations, and states in the Global South have taken up the 
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mantle of the liberal peace. The aim of building a ‘liberal peace’ takes as an 
assumption the “pacifying effects of open and integrated societies and markets 
framed by a liberal state and international institutions, law and norms.”3 However, as 
liberalism is not monolithic, this agenda can have diverse and sometimes conflicting 
manifestations.4 Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks outline four main strands of 
thinking that constitute the liberal peace framework: “the victor’s peace, the 
institutional peace, the constitutional peace and the civil peace.”5 Victor’s peace is 
premised on might, as “a peace which rests on military victory… is more likely to 
survive.” 6  Institutional peace attempts to draw states into a normative and legal 
contexts that determine their behavior nationally and internationally.7 Constitutional 
peace rests on Kantian ideals and the democratic peace thesis, with the conclusion 
that peace requires democratization, trade and a liberal polity.8 Finally, civil peace 
rests on advocacy and activism for the attainment of human rights.9 All of these 
interactive features of the liberal peace interact with the overall shape of the liberal 
peacebuilding project.  
Roger Mac Ginty offers an insightful conceptualization of the liberal peace, as 
a “system of complicity and mutual interest.”10 According to Mac Ginty, this system 
can be understood as “the coming together of hardware (states and institutions) and 
software (the operating system).”11 Institutions are therefore programmed to pursue 
liberal goals, which can be “updated to suit changing environments.”12 This is why 
ideas as diverse as democratization, marketization, the Responsibility to Protect and 
humanitarian intervention can be housed under the umbrella of the liberal peace. 
Thus, while these concepts can be traced to different initiating circumstances, the 
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ultimate thrust is a liberal one, moving towards democratization and marketization. 
These same impulses can be seen to drive much of the transitional justice enterprise. 
Here, I want to offer a brief overview of the progression and pitfalls of liberal 
peacebuilding in theory and practice. It will attempt to situate the ‘crisis’ of liberal 
peacebuilding in historical context, so as to understand the consequent turn to local 
initiatives. 
 With the encumbrance of Cold War geo-political bifurcation washed away, 
the immediate post-Cold War era provided hope for a more proactive role for 
international organizations in the maintenance of peace. The United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations launched fourteen missions between 1988 
and 1992, and this trend was buoyed by seeming success in Namibia and Nicaragua 
in 1990.13 This paved the way for a comprehensive vision of the role of international 
organizations in warring regions. Discourses about ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ 
became enunciated at this moment, best represented in the 1992 Agenda for Peace, 
composed by Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In 
Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali defined the “deepest causes of conflict” as 
“economic despair, social injustice and political oppression.”14 A holistic approach to 
peace was therefore necessary to address these concerns, which was manifested 
through “four key mechanisms: the insertion of political and economic liberalism into 
peace settlements; providing economic advise during implementation; conditionality 
attached to economic assistance; and proxy governance.”15 The orthodoxy became 
that the quick transfusion of liberal institutions would pave the way for a sustainable 
peace. No longer would the United Nations be frustrated in its attempts to proliferate 
peace and development, instead, it would serve as the fulcrum of a “blossoming 
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multilateral progressive consensus for peacemaking, development and social 
justice.”16  
This ambitious vision was almost immediately confronted with a series of 
cataclysms in quick succession: in Somalia, Rwanda, and the Balkans. Meera 
Sabaratnam argues that these setbacks paradoxically bolstered the expansion of the 
new peacebuilding regime. This is because “failures were rationalized through the 
perception that the nature of conflict was changing from interstate to intrastate, and 
into chaotic, unmanageable situations where state institutions had collapsed.”17 Thus, 
while the budding hope and optimism that once drove the peacebuilding project was 
being withered away by stark reality, the liberal peacebuilding project was still intact. 
The emergence of a prolific literature on intractable conflict and ‘failed states’ 
also occurred at this moment, signifying an important discursive shift in academic 
literature on peace and security. Sabaratnam argues that the categorical shift of states 
from ‘transitioning’ to ‘failing’ signified a securitization of areas of conflict, and 
exhibited a growing sense that areas of disorder were contaminating bordering areas 
as they spun further adrift from state authority.18 The reemergence of ‘peace studies’ 
from relative obscurity and its fusion with ‘security studies’ reinforced the security 
dilemma endemic to peacebuilding operations. And yet, from these diverse origins, a 
common consensus emerged that only the liberal peace could address the problems 
beset by warring states. Borrowing from the respective traditions of peace studies and 
security studies, scholars and practitioners understood that “on the basis of superior 
knowledge… and the use of force when necessary, the international community could 
and should undertake more comprehensive and extensive interventions to secure 
global peace.”19 Thus, the dismal realities of peacebuilding operations in these early 
interventions actually served to raise the stakes of the importance of international 
intervention and peacebuilding.  
 It was here that discussions on peacebuilding began to crystallize around the 
importance of ‘good governance’ in order to steer post-conflict states out of a 
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perceived downward spiral of disorder. At this critical juncture, the ‘holistic’ 
approach to peacebuilding found relevant parallels in discussions in development 
circles, which were reeling from the failure of the Washington Consensus.20 If ‘state 
failure’ was a poison that caused societies to disintegrate, then ‘good governance’ 
was the international community’s prescribed antidote. Weak state capacity was 
understood to contribute to the challenges of order and stability in post-conflict states, 
chief among them the “rule of law,” and thus, institutionalization was a necessary 
remedy. According to Laura Zanotti, ‘good governance’ was understood to be a 
universal good, comprehensive and predictable in nature.21 In order to accomplish 
this expanded vision of peacebuilding, a comparable expansion of the scope and 
invasiveness of the international community’s role in conflict-affected states was 
necessary. As Zanotti argues, “in addition to recommending reforms aimed at 
building predictable, regulated and regulatory states… the UN had to equip itself with 
the instruments for knowing, assessing and steering the behavior of states.”22 This 
would require another yet enlargement of the role of international community, to 
create the instruments that would assess the radical project of social reshaping that 
was necessary for a liberal peace. 
This “increasingly interventionist climate” was justified through a rethinking 
of the concept of sovereignty itself, moving from a consideration of sovereignty as 
the exclusive reserve of the state to sovereignty-as-responsibility.23 The formation of 
the International Criminal Court and the adoption of the doctrine of Responsibility to 
Protect are examples of this critical rethinking of sovereignty.24 Mark Duffield argues 
that this constituted a reorganization of the international order as “a world of 
contingent sovereignty,” where “the traditional national/international dichotomy has 
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blurred.” 25  As a result, “the future lies in enmeshing ineffective states within 
international public/private governmental assemblages having the developmental 
technologies and ability to work directly at the level of populations.”26 intervention, 
even trusteeship, was necessary to navigate conflicted states toward the liberal peace.  
Transitional justice literature is an “integral element” of the liberal 
peacebuilding project.27 According to Chandra Lekha Sriram, “concerns for post-
conflict reconstruction have become integrally linked with a wide range of rule-of-
law programming,” and post-conflict justice.28 This is true both in scholarship and in 
practice. The search for ‘holism’ in the liberal peacebuilding agenda allowed the 
newly emerging field of transitional justice to ride on the coattails of the shifting 
international agenda. Adam Branch makes an explicit connection between 
international criminal law, liberal peacebuilding and transitional justice, as 
“transitional justice has risen to the fore of the so-called ‘liberal peacebuilding’ 
agenda as part of the ideological framework for remaking societies.”29 Transitional 
justice literature was adopted in the name of liberal peacebuilding practices, with the 
goal of ushering in the ‘rule of law,’ an emphasis on democratization and the 
democratic peace thesis with the end-goal of crafting a sustainable peace.30  
Scholars and practitioners of the newly emerging field of transitional justice 
largely supported the redefinition of sovereignty to one of sovereignty-as-
responsibility, as the heavy intervention of the international community in domestic 
affairs was a necessary precondition for transitional justice practice. Discourses of 
trauma, healing, illness and recovery “were consistent with the medicalization of 
‘war-torn societies’ as patients or wards of the international community, essentially 
incapacitated and unable to manage.” 31  The core transitional justice concept of  
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“remak[ing] post-conflict social relations and deter[ing] future human rights abuses” 
became prominent discursive elements of liberal peacebuilding at this time.32  
This deep integration of transitional justice with liberal peacebuilding meant 
that transitional justice was not immune when a wave of critical scholarship 
challenged the assumptions, practices and precepts of the liberal peacebuilding 
paradigm. Roland Paris argues that the rapid liberalization that had been a 
cornerstone of the liberal peacebuilding project “is capable of undermining the very 
peace that it is intended to uphold.”33  Paris argues that the rapid democratization and 
marketization attendant to liberal peacebuilding practice creates certain contradictory 
‘pathologies,’ which frustrate the possibility for long-term peace. 34  At the same 
moment, “work focusing on the political economy of war argued that war was its own 
alternative system of profit, power and protection.” 35  The belligerent and 
interventionist posture of the international community came under severe criticism, 
considered to be one aspect of a considerable coercive apparatus constructed in the 
search for the liberal peace. Mac Ginty outlines many charges against the liberal 
peace, including claims that it is ethnocentric, elitist, security-centric, technocratic, 
rigid, superficial, short-termist, neoliberal, and neo-imperial.36 With the onslaught of 
theoretical criticism coupled with challenging reality, the liberal peacebuilding 
paradigm was in crisis.  
One of the main criticisms that was levied against international peacebuilding 
lacked a basic element: legitimacy. By some accounts, the liberal peace was rendered 
illegitimate because it “centered on imposing the Western model of the Weberian 
state on those unwilling or not ready to accept it, and for whom it is thus ‘alien.’”37 
Suthaharan Nadarajah argues that those who deemed the liberal peace illegitimate did 
so on the basis that it favored “local ‘elites’ and international interveners, rather than 
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the majority who bear the weight of both conflict and liberal peace engagements. In 
this way, the latter are alienated from the state-in-formation, as they are alienated 
from the elites who manage it with and for international peacebuilders.” 38  This 
fundamental lack of legitimacy was seen to condemn the liberal peacebuilding project 
to half-measures, superficial successes and ultimate disappointment. Legitimacy, 
here, was understood as a value of confidence in the peacebuilding endeavor, the 
assumption and ownership of a project by the population it is meant to serve. Thus, 
when critical scholars launched a search for alternatives to the liberal peacebuilding 
paradigm, it mainly coalesced around forms of peacebuilding that were considered to 
be more innately ‘legitimate’: local and hybrid forms of peace governance.  
4.2 Local Knowledge and Knowing the Local 
Largely as a result of challenges experienced in the liberal peacebuilding paradigm, 
scholars of transitional justice and peace studies have increasingly focused on the role 
of the ‘local’ in determining whether interventions in conflicted societies will succeed 
or fail. This is because legitimacy is understood to be principally in the domain of the 
local. However, as the following discussion shows, this new focus on the ‘local’ and 
‘legitimacy’ does not necessarily escape the problematic assumptions of the liberal 
peacebuilding paradigm. This is because the role of the ‘local’ is often relegated to 
procedural considerations rather than substantive ones. This is not to dismiss the 
existence or utility of this paradigm wholesale, but rather, to question, “what are the 
politics of invoking hybridity?”39 As Suthaharan Nadarajah aptly notes, one must 
“acknowledge hybridity’s potential for resistance and progressive agendas, but 
question whether it can be always equated with these.”40  
 Thania Paffenholz argues that the ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding occurred in 
two successive waves, each with a different theoretical underpinning and 
consequently different understandings of the ‘local’.41 The first wave emerged in the 
1990s in the ‘conflict transformation’ school of conflict management as a response to 
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the failures of peacebuilding operations in Somalia, Rwanda and the Balkans. This 
wave of the ‘local turn’ moved into the orthodoxy of the international community’s 
theorization of peace, as evidenced by the explosion of initiatives and funding under 
the umbrella of ‘civil society’ and ‘local ownership’.42 According to Paffenholz, this 
wave of scholarship “emphasized the necessity of empowering local people as the 
primary authors of peacebuilding instead of externally designed and driven peace 
interventions.”43 In this first wave of the ‘local turn,’ the question of ‘legitimacy’ was 
of chief importance. There was an assumption that “only local actors from within the 
conflict context would be able to build sustainable peace in their own countries.”44 
According to this wave of scholarship, the international community was misguided in 
their attempts at intervention as they were incapable of understanding the wants and 
needs of the local community. The end-goal was effective collaboration between 
these two groups, because “once the international peace builder has understood the 
importance of the local, the latter can be more effectively supported.”45   
 By contrast, the second generation of the local turn operates from another 
theoretical grounding entirely, it relies primarily on Foucauldian and postcolonial 
understandings of hybridity. Authors such as Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond 
conceptualize the local turn as a form of resistance against liberal peacebuilding, and 
recognize local agency as constituting the building block of a post-liberal order.46 
Local agency is understood to be exercised at all levels of society, it is inherently 
counter-hegemonic. The local, here, means something qualitatively different than it 
does in the first iteration of the local turn, here it is “defined in opposition to the 
international” and constitutes a bulwark against the ongoing liberal peacebuilding 
project.47  
According to Oliver Richmond, a reformulation of the liberal peacebuilding 
paradigm is tantamount to “old wine in new bottles,” and therefore cannot close the 
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distance between local and liberal politics.48 Richmond proposes a radical rethinking 
of the peacebuilding process, with an eye to the inclusion of the ‘everyday.’ The 
politics of the everyday does not focus on the practices and policies of elites, but 
instead investigates how “people are able to adapt and take ownership over structures 
and institutions, so that they begin to reflect their own everyday lives rather than 
attempts at assimilation.”49 Through passive resistance, radical resistance, alterity and 
subversion, local actors exercise agency over their conditions. This context produces 
a liberal-local hybridization which, in certain instances, can be the foundation for 
peace.50 While promising, this second generation of the local turn endures more in 
scholarship than in peacebuilding practice. It is the first wave of scholarship, with its 
emphasis on ‘local ownership’ and the involvement of local scholars that has had 
more of an impact on peacebuilding as an enterprise.  
The localizing efforts that swept transitional justice are almost entirely 
indebted to the first wave of the ‘local turn’ scholarship in peacebuilding. This has 
translated into a deep investment in discourses surrounding ‘local ownership,’ 
‘bottom-up justice,’ and ‘participation and consultation’ in justice processes.51 The 
contentious topic of debate, here, is usually depicted as a struggle between the 
comparative value of accountability and objectivity provided by international justice 
processes, and legitimacy and agency offered by local justice processes. However, the 
transitional justice vision of ‘local ownership’ runs into myriad challenges. It creates 
an untenable binary between the local and international, effectively discarding the 
dynamism between the two. It effaces the power imbalances embedded in these 
relationships in assuming that there could ever be a ‘pure’ local system of justice. It 
also makes problematic assumptions about the relational value of the justice 
mechanisms at both ‘poles’ of this dichotomy: the presumptions that the 
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‘international’ offers objectivity, and that the ‘local’ is inherently legitimate runs into 
serious challenges.  
 In order to understand the opportunities and challenges inherent to the local 
turn in transitional justice, one must first deconstruct the concept of the ‘local.’ Here, 
I analyze the construction and instrumentalization of the ‘local’ identity in 
peacebuilding and transitional justice efforts, and consider the binary opposition of 
the local/international interface, as well as the challenges of hegemonic dominance 
within categories of the ‘local.’ While the newfound emphasis on local justice in 
transitional justice is a welcome change from older, universalizing paradigms, it 
presents a whole host of new challenges that prevent it from realizing the counter-
hegemonic ideals of its most ardent supporters. For all the talk of ‘hidden agency,’ 
subversion, and resistance, one must not lose sight of the continual presence of 
domination, coercion and hegemony.  
In order to integrate ‘the local’ into transitional justice and peacebuilding 
exercises, one must have a malleable, tangible, concrete idea of what it means to be 
‘local.’ In transitional justice, there is a distinct vision of the ‘local’ that is rife with 
unsubstantiated assumptions with problematic outcomes. Here, the ‘local’ is the 
opposite of the ‘international,’ and both concepts are mutually constituted through 
their interactions with one another.  As well, the local acquires ‘localness’ through its 
interaction with the international, and vice versa. Here, the ‘local’ was understood to 
principally constitute those at the middle level of society, as the “local is defined by 
its peacebuilding potential.” 52  Clearly, defining the local in such exclusive and 
instrumentalist terms divests subaltern populations of their agency and peacebuilding 
potential. This section will unpack the concept of the ‘local’ and uncover the 
problems embedded with conceptions of ‘local knowledge’ and ‘local ownership.’ 
Understandings of power, hierarchy and hegemony are defined-in to these relational 
concepts, which frustrates the possibility of emancipatory hybrid interactions from 
the outset.  
 The production, dissemination and instrumentalization of knowledge is of 
utmost importance where it concerns ‘the local.’ As a matter of course, knowledge in 
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transitional justice is often goal-oriented and pragmatic in nature, it is distilled into a 
form that is amenable to “technocratic approaches to engineering political change.”53 
One of the ways that the local turn in transitional justice has impacted upon the field 
is to combat the universalizing, top-down approaches to knowledge in an attempt to 
integrate ‘local knowledge’ into the fold. However, in order to do so, local knowledge 
has had to be packaged and presented in a way that is amenable to blueprints, 
checklists and practical agendas. A process is then undertaken by which local 
knowledge is processed and judged useful.54 This point is eloquently explored by 
Suthaharan Nadarajah. Even when international peacebuilders, and by extention, 
transitional justice advocates, attempt to resist the liberal peace, they must 
…engage with and encompass these more ‘indigenous’ social forms within a 
more nuanced and intensified power/knowledge framework, rendering them 
knowable and amenable to international peacebuilding practices – albeit ones 
now emphasising ‘empathy’ and ‘local legitimacy’, whether the local and 
everyday form the basis for more effective statebuilding or an international-
local peacebuilding ‘contract’.55  
 
This has a dynamic influence on the content and meaning of the knowledge, 
as it is grafted on to a pre-existing logic of social change. As Martin Nakata argues, 
local knowledge “becomes not embedded in local meanings and contexts but 
separated from its original context - an entity to be studied, worked on, developed, 
integrated, transferred, and ultimately changed to fit another.” 56  Curating local 
knowledge that supports the overall project of transitional justice, itself, then, cannot 
be considered to be an inherently emancipatory act. Through this process of selection 
and rejection, privileging and silencing, ‘local knowledge’ comes to be informed, and 
indeed, defined, by the same hegemonic processes that it is meant to redress.  
 The ideas and values that one ascribes to the ‘local’ can also be a potential 
pitfall in transitional justice and peacebuilding. Mac Ginty highlights a principle 
challenge in ‘romanticizing the local’ in discourses that surround localizing efforts in 
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peacebuilding. As Mac Ginty writes, “it is possible to develop a simplistic binary 
narrative in which ‘indigenous’ and ‘traditional’ aspects of society are equated with 
being organic, natural, unpolluted, sustainable, authentic and normatively good.”57 
This romanticization is particularly prone to occur when opposed to a caricature of a 
malevolent and oppressive West, where complex dynamics are reduced to “saintly 
locals and devilish internationals.”58 The essentialism intrinsic to this romanticized 
portrait is ultimately destructive for many reasons.  
First, it is an artifice. It paints an unreal and hyper-deterministic portrait of 
relations on the local-international interface, which is a poor foundation from which 
to comprehend a complicated web of histories, interests, individuals, and systems. 
The simplicity afforded by this script is undercut when it is confronted with the messy 
realities of lived experience in conflicted regions. It simply cannot capture the 
complex ways in which people navigate conflicted terrain. With these embedded 
assumptions, the blueprint for social change that is produced is likely to be 
misguided, at best, and harmful, at worst.  
Second, a romanticized vision of the local erases the existence of hegemonies 
that exist within local communities, which is tantamount to reinforcing them. As Mac 
Ginty rightly notes, many local approaches to peacemaking, and for our purposes, 
transitional justice, are conservative in nature and strengthen the position of elites.59 
The disenfranchisement of women, regional minorities, and those removed from the 
reaches of power can be reinforced through the invocation and use of customary 
practices. Simon Robins makes this case incredibly well in relation to post-conflict 
Nepal. Robins argues that social exclusion in Nepal is reinforced through transitional 
justice mechanisms, which “marginalizes victims and their agendas” and is 
“dominated by a narrow legalism that neglects the priorities of victims.”60 The fact 
that narrow legalism is a feature of human rights discourse and transitional justice 
practice, Robins argues, allows local elites to translate the outcomes to suit their own 
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ends. Thus, “the result of rights language in Nepal emerging almost exclusively from 
dominant power groups is that it becomes an elite discourse.”61 Rights language is 
“removed from the concerns of the marginalized and constrained by the political and 
other priorities of the privileged.” 62  In sum, the particular plane of interaction 
between the international and the local, here, results in the privileging of already-
privileged Nepalese. As Robins astutely notes, this is not a particular feature of 
human rights or transitional justice, rather, “in an unequal society, human rights as 
any other discourse will be articulated subject to existing power relations.” 63 
However, a romanticized vision of the local is rendered entirely impervious to these 
concerns. If this is allowed to occur, it is altogether possible that continued 
oppression of subaltern populations would be shrouded in the emancipatory language 
of resistance.  
Finally, the romanticization of the local conceives of the ‘local’ as a distinct 
unitary entity, universal across space and time.64 As Séverine Autessere puts it “the 
definition of ‘local,’ like that of ‘peace,’ is constructed rather than given.”65 This 
means that the particular manner in which the local is constructed is illustrative of 
undergirding assumptions and existing hierarchies. Autessere argues that the 
particular construction of the local/international dichotomy is constructed with two 
particular assumptions as basis. The first conceives of the local as “insular or 
provincial,” which “ignores the fact that many residents of the host countries have 
international knowledge and experience.” 66  The second assumption is the 
homogeneity of the local, where “the opposition between expatriates and locals is 
central to the intervener’s way of seeing the world.”67 According to Autessere, “for 
interveners, local people are the primary Others.” 68  This effaces the differences 
between localities across the globe and even within the space of the local. It goes 
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without saying that the politics of the local is historically and politically contingent, 
as it encompasses as much dynamism as one can possibly conceive. And yet, the 
image of the ‘local’ is contrasted against the ‘global’ in a simplistic binary, often 
acting as a container of opposites to the construction of the global. It is crucial to 
understand the source of this image, and its impact. 
One reason for this binary between the local/international is a need for policy-
directed scholarship to make the local apprehendable, usable, and comprehensible. 
This is because the local itself, as a concrete and bounded entity, is a necessary 
instrument for peace in ‘local turn’ discourse. Indeed, just as in the case of local 
knowledge, there is a pressing need to make the local, her customs, knowledge and 
ways of being knowable and apprehendable. Predictability is necessary in order to 
construct technocratic programs for social change. A homogenous image of the local 
is predictable, even if it is false, and can thus be used to the service of pragmatic 
social programming. 
But there is another reason for this binary, and it strikes at the very heart of 
the local turn in transitional justice. It can also be attributed to a deep-seated 
incoherence in localizing efforts, which is a clash between the logics of the particular 
and the universal. Here, the ‘global’ is universal; it is understood in terms of 
ideological consistency, normative dictates and legalistic language that encompasses 
the globe. For example, transitional justice literature addresses ‘victims’ and 
‘perpetrators’ as coherent concepts, which attributes constancy to these categories 
that can only be clear in the abstract. These categories are then applied, a priori, to 
transitional societies. However, the ‘local’ is inherently particular; it is bounded in 
place and time by historical trajectories, individual agency, narrative, language, and 
memory. Attempts to make the local knowable to the global are ultimately acts of 
translation. It is an attempt to render the local in terms comprehensible by those who 
are not enmeshed in the particulars of a certain context. The romanticization of the 
local results in a bastardized vision of the local, it is true, but a readable and 
understandable one. Only when the local can be rendered intelligible can the 
technocratic forms of knowledge that form the basis of transitional justice gain 
credence.  
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Many of the pragmatic attempts to comprehend the local circulate around a 
central idea: legitimacy. In liberal states, the social contract is the source of 
legitimacy that “binds elites and populations together.”69 Legitimacy in peacebuilding 
is a prized, but often illusory, goal. Contemporary peacebuilding in the liberal mode 
is understood to be in the midst of a ‘legitimacy crisis’ or ‘legitimacy lacuna’. This is 
demonstrated by “cloistering offices in walled compounds with armed checkpoints, 
using armoured cars and armed guards for transformation and protection… used to 
impose a material and immaterial border and to increase distance between the 
international and the local.”70 The lack of legitimacy for international projects is a 
deep concern for peacebuilders and transitional justice scholars.  
Legitimacy is understood to tie local communities to the transitional justice 
project, incentivizing participation and investment in its tenets. If only local 
populations could view the peacebuilding and transitional justice projects as 
legitimate, the argument goes, there would be a marked success. The problem arises 
when scholars then move to the realm of prescription in order to solve this legitimacy 
crisis. They attempt to solve this problem by turning to ways to ‘generate’ legitimacy. 
This amounts to mining ‘the local’ for its legitimacy which can then be grafted onto 
existing peacebuilding and transitional justice projects.  
The first problem is that legitimacy is understood to be derived from 
‘representation’ and ‘ownership’ of peace processes by local actors. In order to fulfill 
these roles, local elites are often conscripted to lead the charge, with questionable 
outcomes.71 Legitimacy is not, and cannot, be automatically conferred on a project 
simply by the fact of local integration. It is a multifactorial process of communities 
coming to evaluate the fittingness, meaningfulness and utility of processes to their 
own lives and to the community at large. Legitimacy is not an ingredient to be added 
to peace processes to ensure their efficacy; rather, it is the outcome of communities 
determining that peace and transitional justice processes pass the muster of 
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community and individual needs. 
The second problem with this technocratic approach to legitimacy is its 
ultimate instrumentalization. Andrew Friedman demonstrates this by asserting that 
the chief challenge facing localizing efforts in transitional justice is merely “to 
determine where such local ownership may be inserted into transitional justice 
mechanisms.”72 Local ownership, here, is grafted on to a pre-existing framework of 
producing social change. Legitimacy is treated as a currency that can purchase 
increased success for the transitional justice process, rather than an end itself. 
According to Nadarajah and Rampton, “hybridity is… offered as potentially speeding 
up implementation and local acceptance of neoliberal frameworks.”73 In the search 
for pragmatic concreteness, legitimacy becomes an element to graft on to peace 
processes to ensure their success, rather than a concept by which one can evaluate the 
ethics of a particular practice. This mode of thinking is illustrated by David Roberts 
when he poses the question, “if local legitimacy is lacking, how might it be 
generated?” 74  Here, legitimacy acts as a means to rationalize and legitimize the 
peacebuilding process. Instead of evaluating the reasons why local legitimacy would 
be absent, instead, the focus is on engineering legitimacy in the service of 
peacebuilding.   
4.3 Hybrid Interfaces 
Largely as a result of challenges experienced in the liberal peacebuilding paradigm, a 
growing number of scholars of transitional justice and peace studies have focused on 
the role of the ‘local’ in determining whether interventions in conflicted societies will 
succeed or fail. This is because legitimacy is understood to be principally in the 
domain of the local. However, as the following discussion will show, this new focus 
on the ‘local’ and ‘legitimacy’ does not necessarily escape the problematic 
assumptions of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm. This is because the role of the 
‘local’ is often relegated to procedural considerations rather than substantive ones. 
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This is not to dismiss the existence or utility of this paradigm wholesale, but rather, to 
question, “what are the politics of invoking hybridity?”75 As Suthaharan Nadarajah 
aptly notes, one must “acknowledge hybridity’s potential for resistance and 
progressive agendas, but question whether it can be always equated with these.”76  
The presence of hegemony and domination does not simplify the complicated 
nexus at which the local and the international meet. Instead, it produces a complicated 
web of interactions that cannot be distilled to a simplistic binary. Evaluating the 
claims of local agency, post-liberal peacebuilding and emancipation in the form of 
hybridity requires unpacking these moments of association between the local and the 
international, in order to lay bare the politics of hierarchy and resistance within these 
interfaces. It is in fact true that “hybridization, rather than liberalization, has been the 
dominant trend” in peacebuilding.77 I want to argue that at present, localized forms of 
transitional justice do not produce emancipating hybridities for subaltern populations. 
This is because it is a hybridization of practice rather than a hybridization of 
undergirding assumptions, and also because many aspects of hierarchy are 
reproduced in the name of hybridity. This section considers two manifestations of the 
hybridization of transitional justice, hybrid tribunals and the revival of customary 
practices. This thesis demonstrates that in these hybrid interfaces, the machinations of 
hegemony continue to dictate the course of justice. However, this does not hold fast 
in all cases, and does not preclude the possibility of ‘everyday agency’ serving as the 
foundation for emancipation in the future.  
Many discourses carry the banner of hybridity, ranging from the radical and 
emancipatory to the moderate and procedural. In practice, transitional justice’s 
assumption of hybridity has been primarily of the moderate sort, it emphasizes 
hybridity of actors rather than assumptions. Transitional justice is tied to the first 
wave of the local turn, not the second. As a result, many of the opportunities for 
subaltern agency and emancipation provided by hybridity are lost. In sum, a non-
radical vision of hybridity is unlikely to produce radical ends.  
Hybridization of transitional justice has particularly taken the form of hybrid 
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tribunals, which are considered to be the complementary engagement of international 
law and domestic law in order to “provide the necessary resources and guarantees for 
a high level of justice in the country where the conflict occurred.”78 Judicial systems 
were often in shambles by conflict’s end, and hybrid tribunals were understood to be 
a way to reconstruct “law, order, and stability” which were the “essential condictions 
for a fair and effective judiciary.”79 Unlike the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), these hybrid tribunals are locally-based. A number of hybrid criminal 
tribunals have subsequently proliferated, in Cambodia (1997), Kosovo (2000), Timor-
Leste (2000), Sierra Leone (2002), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (2005).80 Criticisms 
of liberal peacebuilding have been central to the construction of these apparatuses. 
According to Padraig McAuliffe, hybrid tribunals were the result of a dialetic process 
“revealed through critique of international tribunals in terms of axes of legitimacy, 
capacity building and norm penetration, which were then contrasted with the benefits 
of local participation and location in the State where the crimes occurred.”81 Thus, the 
model’s potential was understood to be the legitimacy that local participation 
conferred onto the justice process. 
According to Laura Dickenson, the hybridity of these courts emerges from the 
engagement of international apparatuses alongside domestic legal instruments, 
resulting in a “blend of the international and the domestic.”82 In hybrid courts, foreign 
and domestic judges adjudicate cases litigated by a mix of local and international 
legal experts. Thus, the hybridity of these structures is meant to emerge from their 
procedures and a variation of actors. However, this troublingly leaves some 
underlying assumptions uncontested.  
First, supporters of hybrid tribunals envision of the international community 
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as inherently ‘objective’ in its interventions in domestic disputes, and uses this idea to 
bolster their integration into domestic legal systems. 83  The objectivity of the 
international community was meant to be a bulwark against “state complicity, cover-
up, and other obstructions [of] the very possibility of justice.”84 However, this vision 
seriously underestimates the deep politicization of international actors in conflicted 
contexts. For one, one must note that the conflicts that are attempting to be reconciled 
are not confined to the particular territory in which the violence occurs. Rather, 
conflict in the globalized age is international. Jan Selby rightly notes “peace 
processes are typically informed by sharply realist power politics.” 85  Roger Mac 
Ginty eloquently refers to this paradox as the “Janus-faced nature of hybridity,” 
noting that “Canadian troops fired 4.7 million bullets in Afghanistan in a twenty-
month period in the mid-2000s, while, at the same time, Afghanistan was Canada’s 
largest recipient of international assistance,” with much of that assistance earmarked 
for peace processes. 86  Interactions between the international and the local in 
conflicted contexts begin long before the moment of reconciliation, which casts 
serious doubt on the possibility of international community’s ‘objectivity.’ 
 Second, hierarchy in hybrid tribunals is manifested in certain pedagogical 
practices that shape the procedures and outcomes of the trials. As there is the 
assumption that “the transitional State… knows neither democracy nor justice,” many 
hybrid tribunals are structured in manners that explicitly limit local determination.87 
In the hybrid tribunals in Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to Elizabeth Brunch, 
there were institutional differences in the treatment of international judges and staff 
and local judges and staff which reinforced the “retaining wall” between the groups.88 
These distinctions included the living conditions, travel and pay disparities between 
the international and domestic staff. One of the most salient examples Brunch 
                                                 
83 Ibid., 83. 
84 Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA, 2002), 65. 
85 The peacebuilding project itself is one that is deeply economically, ideologically and politically 
motivated. For more, see Jan Selby, “The Political Economy of Peace Processes,” in Whose Peace? 
Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding, ed. Michael C. Pugh, Neil Cooper, 
and Mandy Turner (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
86 Roger Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance, 80. 
87 Padraig McAuliffe, “Hybrid Tribunals at Ten,” 9. 
88 Elizabeth Brunch, “Hybrid Courts: Examining Hybridity Through a Post-Colonial Lens,” Boston 
University International Law Journal 28, no. 1 (2010), 13. 
62 
 
 
 
provides is the case of language, she notes “the idea that international judges and staff 
might use (or learn) the national language(s) was never suggested; English was the 
primary language of daily interaction…” 89  While this is par for the course in 
international work, Brunch incisively connects it to the impact of hierarchy and status 
that operated within the institutional structure. International judges and staff assumed 
the role of ‘supra-citizens,’ a class of mobile professionals with social and economic 
capital that serve ‘sub-citizens,’ the locally-bound beneficiaries of their work. 90 
Brunch argues that these structures of membership created an “ambivalent and 
unequal hybridity” that colored the work done by the court, and impacted upon its 
decisions.91 This example clearly demonstrates that hybrid institutions have as much 
capacity to institutionalize and reinforce existing hierarchies as it has the potential to 
dismantle them.  
 The final challenge is the interpretation and reformulation of law and 
knowledge in hegemonic ways. True to the hybrid name, “there is no single or 
monolithic model of hybrid tribunals, and all manifestations enjoy a diverse 
nomenclature.”92 However, as a matter of practice in hybrid tribunals, “judges apply 
domestic law that has been reformed to accord with international standards.”93 This 
reformulation of law can have distinct impacts on the decisions themselves, as well as 
the legal and ideological reasoning that leads to the decisions. Brunch argues that this 
‘reformulation’ is can be tantamount to the “wholesale importation of human rights 
law” on the basis of universality.94 While it is not necessary to outline the long-
standing debate on the universality of human rights here, Brunch makes the cogent 
case that the uncritical application of human rights law in hybrid tribunals is a 
demonstration of hierarchical power relations amongst states. She concludes that the 
outcome of this imposition is the “translation of the law of Europe… to the domestic 
legal system” and “shifted the balance of power toward international or European 
dominance while simultaneously ensuring that Bosnia was always ‘not quite’ 
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Europe.”95 reformulation of knowledge and legalism can reinforce what Dustin Sharp 
calls a “subtext of locals as passive recipients of international justice discourse and 
practice.”96   
Customary practices of justice are at the very core of localized efforts to 
forward transitional justice. Cynthia Horne argues that “attention to culturally 
resonant and community-driven approaches provides needed balance” to early efforts 
that were driven externally, and drew on Western understandings of law and 
society.97 By and large, localizing transitional justice has meant a hearty embrace of 
customary practices.98 There is an embedded assumption that customary practices and 
traditional justice holds the important element of ‘legitimacy.’ Therefore, if local 
practices and understandings of justice inform the transitional justice project, the 
overall project would be markedly more successful. “Bottom-up” approaches to 
transitional justice are the logical extension of this understanding. Horne describes the 
three key features of bottom-up programs. First, bottom-up programs “hav[e] the 
affected communities themselves generate programs reflecting their ideas for 
reconciliation.”99 Second, they “incorporate traditional practices to confer additional 
legitimacy on the proceedings.”100   Finally, “locals implement the programs at a 
community level in order to facilitate citizen participation.”101 All of these features 
are meant to embed the transitional justice project within the community, such that 
the community would embrace the project as germane to their process of healing. 
Problematically, this impulse often represents the instrumentalization of 
customary practices to forward the overarching goals of transitional justice. Toby S. 
Goldbach writes about the distinction between the ‘instrumental’ and ‘expressive’ 
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genres of law. For Goldbach, the instrumental genre of law responds to means and 
ends, while the expressive genre of law deals with the generation and production of 
meaning.102 In relation to the adoption of Indigenous sentencing circles in Canadian 
criminal law, Goldbach utilizes the useful language of ‘instrumentalizing the 
expressive,’ which means “fashioning constructed expressions of culture into an 
instrument for use— may present new and troubling implications for what it means to 
employ the law as a tool metaphor.”103 The instrumentalization of custom to the ends 
of transitional justice may itself reintroduce the “hegemonic logic of means and 
ends,” and risks “destabilizing developments in its effort to deem everything up for 
instrumental grabs.” 104  Goldbach utilizes the language of ‘transplantation’ and 
‘translation’ to convey the movement between the instrumental and the expressive, in 
order to conclude that this moment of conversion presents a “jeopardy for unmet 
expectations.”105 This is the first challenge of the instrumentalization of customary 
justice. 
There are more challenges inherent to the instrumentalization of custom. 
Customary practices are intimately tied to their local contexts, meaning that they are 
often deeply politicized. Joanna R. Quinn makes the compelling case that the 
formalization and codification process of customary mechanisms is by no means 
apolitical, but is instead intimately tied to political processes. For example, according 
to Quinn, “the government of Uganda has inserted itself into the day-to-day workings 
of the traditional cultural institutions themselves.”106  
The perceived independence of customary justice from external actors, 
commonly understood to be the source of local ‘agency,’ is disputed by Cynthia 
Horne. In post-conflict Aceh and Timor-Leste, Horne argues, scholars that laud the 
‘bottom-up’ transitional justice mechanisms for their ‘authenticity’ “understate the 
role played by extra-regional actors in actually reconstructing and implementing these 
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‘traditional’ justice programmes.”107  Horne writes of a process of ‘reconstitution’ 
wherein international actors are intimately involved in the overall shape and tenor of 
purportedly ‘bottom-up’ mechanisms. Indeed, Horne argues that it was the external 
actors that primarily implemented the indigenous practices and their implementation, 
ultimately distorting the symbolic meanings associated with the practices. 
The decision to incorporate adat, or customary Indonesian reconciliation 
practice, into the transitional justice program in Aceh was determined in the design 
phase of the project, which occurred in Helskini. The Helsinki process was run almost 
to the exclusion of Indonesian representatives, even as the decision was made to 
incorporate ‘bottom-up’ transitional justice initiatives.108 Horne cites an Indonesian 
negotiator in the process as confirming “the use of adat was driven by the 
international community in Aceh and East Timor.”109 Thus, even as the international 
community embraced local customary practices with a renewed zeal, the power to 
make the decision about the ultimate shape of the transitional justice enterprise was in 
Helsinki, not in Aceh. This is not to cast aspersions on the ultimate utility of the 
inclusion of adat in Aceh, gacaca in Rwanda, or mato oput in Uganda. The aim, here 
is to interrogate where the decision-making power ultimately rests, and to what 
specific aims the customary practices are utilized.  
This demonstrates a central tension within the localizing turn in transitional 
justice. Here, it is the process of transitional justice that is negotiable, and not the 
end-point. Even when infused with the express purpose of ‘localizing’ transitional 
justice, there are inherent tensions between the universalizing, liberalizing end-goals 
of transitional justice and the customary practices which are employed to serve its 
ends. Legitimacy is conferred onto the overall transitional justice enterprise through 
this fusion, but the assumptions and rationales of transitional justice as a hegemonic 
discourse remain intact. Liberal democracy, marketization and the ‘rule of law’ are 
non-negotiable outcomes of the transitional justice enterprise. Customary practices of 
justice and reconciliation are thus relegated to the subordinate position as instruments 
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to the ends of these goals; that is, customary practices serve as the vehicles to secure 
these outcomes, rather than outcomes in their own right.  
4.4 Hybridity Reexamined 
This is not to argue that local agency is completely circumscribed in hybrid 
interactions. Indeed, fascinating studies of the ‘everyday’ demonstrate an incredible 
subaltern potential for adaption, contestation, cooption and resistance. Even actions 
that international actors may consider to be ‘spoiling’ the process can emerge from 
this impulse. Richmond and Mitchell argue that partial compliance and cooptation 
can be an act of local authorship, it can emerge as “a means for reforming the norms 
and institutions that were in effect imposed on them.”110 This is illustrative of the 
vision of hybridity informed by postcolonialism. Rather than viewing the relationship 
of hegemony as one of complete determinism, scholars such as Homi Bhabha have 
articulated that at the meeting of different constituencies a ‘Third Space’ is borne, 
which is a site of subversion and a “renegotiation of cultures and identity, and 
multiple positionality.” 111  For Bhabha, the hybrid holds a valorized position of 
ultimate resistance against hegemonic power. According to Amar Acheraïou, Bhabha 
understood hybridity to be the “fundamental tool by which the colonized resisted and 
subverted the colonizer’s cultural, political and ideological domination.”112 Agency, 
here, lies in the ability to upend hegemonic order through subversion, resistance and 
negotiation.  
 However, it is important not to lose sight of hierarchy in the search for local 
agency. It is true that hybridity can serve as an opportunity for local and even 
subaltern populations to demonstrate incredible dynamism. However, Nadarajah and 
Rampton argue that a consequence of “locating in ‘hidden’ local agency both 
resistance to liberal peace and the possibility of ‘alternative’ hybrid forms of 
peace/building is the neglect of economic and social structures” as well as an 
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understanding of “how the international weighs heavily on the local.”113 Customary 
practices of justice are not exempt from this calculus. Where customary peacemaking 
and justice practices are “permitted by the liberal peace,” they always occur “in a 
meta-environment shaped by liberal peace norms and institutions….”114  For Mac 
Ginty, this means that one can envision indigenous peace and reconciliation 
initiatives as occurring at the behest of a “paradigm established elsewhere.”115 Often, 
the impulse for local ownership, integration and agency therefore acts as an 
amendment to the transitional justice toolkit, rather than a wholesale revision of its 
contents.  
Hybrid transitional justice does not escape the logic of the liberal peace. For 
all the literature that declares the death knell of liberal peacebuilding, reality suggests 
that the underlying project remains very much intact. This is because the liberal peace 
forms the skeleton onto which the peacebuilding project is grafted: it provides the 
ideological, political, and practical means by which peacebuilding is conceptualized 
and implemented. It has been so thoroughly ingrained in humanitarian, development 
and justice works that even discourse at the margins of these fields are colored by its 
influence. For Richmond and Mitchell, “the liberal register in which peacebuilding 
occurs made it extremely difficult to conduct unscripted conversations with local 
communities or elites.”116  In essence, hybrid forms of justice in the current mode can 
serve as mere vectors for the production of legitimacy, to complete for the overriding 
project of human rights, democratization and marketization. In hybrid transitional 
justice, the liberal peace assumes a new and more ‘legitimate’ shape.
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Chapter 5  
5 Constructing the Victim, Settling Accounts 
Transitional justice prides itself on being ‘victim-centered’ as a field, with an 
emphasis on victims’ desires, needs and dignity post-conflict. Transitional justice 
processes are frequently accompanied by a call to “ask the victims what they want,” 
which “reinforces the notion that victims should occupy a central role in determining 
responses to harm.” 1  But before questions of culpability, accountability and 
reconciliation can have salience in transitional justice, the categories of ‘victim’ and 
‘perpetrator’ must be constructed and codified. However, the realities of mass atrocity 
and conflict rarely comport with these sanitized categories. The particular manner of 
the construction of these categories, and their use in the social project of transitional 
justice requires further scrutiny. This chapter has three main purposes. First, it 
considers and complicates the particular construction of the victim in transitional 
justice and its usage. Second, it considers the ways that the search for justice in the 
name of victims can result in the instrumentalization of victim’s narratives and 
victims themselves. Finally, it finds that the practice of ‘settling accounts’ in truth 
commissions can have the effect of neutralizing contesting narratives of victimhood.  
5.1 Constructions of Victimhood in Transitional Justice 
As Annalise Acorn writes, “we do not feel pity for those who bring about their own 
demise.”2 Ultimately, the determination of those victim narratives that are deemed 
worthy of compassion is intimately tied to perceptions of agency. For those to whom 
one extends their compassion, blots of character and difficult decisions are often 
smoothed out with the assurance of determinism. On the other hand, narratives that 
are deemed unworthy of compassion are suffused with agency. Bronwyn Leebaw 
outlines Hannah Arendt’s distinction between ‘temptation’ and ‘coercion,’ with 
ultimately different culpabilities. “Arendt insisted that, ‘if someone points a gun at 
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you and says, ‘Kill your friend or I will kill you,’ he is tempting you, that is all.’”3 
When it comes to perpetrators, the question of agency is tied up in considerations of 
their ultimate culpability in atrocities. Consider, for example, the long-standing 
deliberations about the ultimate culpability of ‘big fish,’ the leaders of organizations 
charged with atrocities and the ‘small fry,’ those at the bottom of the totem pole that 
executed orders from those above them. However, as this section demonstrates, the 
same logic of agency and culpability is used to determine the veracity of victim 
narratives, and the victimhood of victims themselves. The construction of victims in 
transitional justice is problematic in three main ways: first, it defines victims 
reductively in opposition to perpetrators; second, it demands ‘innocence’ from 
victims in order to claim the mantle of victimhood; and finally, it excludes the 
possibility of actors that do not fit comfortably on any side of this dichotomy.  
Transitional justice literature often relies on a construction of victims and 
perpetrators as existing on a diametrically opposed binary. As Tristan Anne Borer 
notes, there is an implicit assumption here that the groups are homogenous, “victims 
and perpetrators are referred to as if they are all the same. The victims and The 
perpetrators.”4 The interrelations between these groups are similarly scripted. Govier 
and Voerword outline this dichotomy as follows: “One person acts; the other is acted 
upon. One harms; the other is harmed. One is evil; the other is good. One bears 
responsibility; the other none.”5 Clearly this dichotomy is reductive, as it shrinks 
complex interrelations in situations of extreme stress to a morality play between the 
forces of good and evil. There is an important parallel here to the construction of 
victims of ‘ordinary crimes,’ or those crimes that are not understood to rise to the 
level of mass atrocity. Alleta Brenner considers the victim-perpetrator binary in the 
case of rape. Brenner argues that the victim-perpetrator binary is “simultaneously 
fixed and relational.”6 This means that the crime itself, and its mutually constitutive 
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categories of ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ are all intricately tied to one another. Here, 
victims are primarily constituted through their experience of harm from perpetrators. 
Thus, there can be no crime without a perpetrator and victim, and no victim without a 
distinct perpetrator. This reductive approach to conflict belies the fact that reality can 
have multiple, contradictory elements.  
One must also consider the sorts of harm that can be accounted for by this 
victim-perpetrator nexus. As this dichotomy relies on a perpetrator to act against a 
victim, this greatly reduces the scope of possible harm to that which can be 
understood on an interpersonal level. Here, in order to claim the mantle of 
victimhood, one must have been harmed by an individual perpetrator in a tangible, 
knowable way.7  This is a result of the fact that harms in transitional justice are 
conceptualized as violations of human rights, which are individual in nature. Human 
rights theory presumes that individuals constitute the reserve of rights-holders, as 
rights are a “justified claim on someone for something that is owed.”8 This limits the 
scope of the human rights enterprise to those that can be articulated within the liberal, 
individual framework.  The consequence is that may lose the opportunity to redress 
systemic-level harms, which are often diffuse and imprecise in nature, and unsuitable 
to be conceptualized through a victim-perpetrator dichotomy.9 
 This victim-perpetrator dichotomy also constructs a particular vision of an 
idealized ‘victim,’ which can become a litmus test to claim the mantle of victimhood. 
Susan Hirsch uses the provocative language of the ‘victim deserving of global justice’ 
to illustrate this point. Particularly after the ratification of the Rome Statute which 
explicitly centers the figure of the victim, Hirsch presciently reminds readers that “the 
establishment and early development of new global institutions is intertwined with 
the constitution of new global subjects.” 10  To explain this point, Ben Golder 
illustrates the Foucauldian vision of the ‘ambivalence of rights,’ which means that 
“position of rights- claimant or rights-holder is simultaneously our entry into regimes 
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of power- knowledge which bind us to particular truths, ways of thinking and acting 
and being.”11 This means that at the moment that one claims a right and the privileges 
associated by that right, one becomes a subject produced by the definitional constricts 
of that right. Here, the victim becomes a ‘victim-subject,’ or “one who conforms to 
institutional requirements” of victimhood.12  
Innocence is an important aspect of the construction of victimhood in 
transitional justice. For victims to be ‘true’ victims, transitional justice requires a 
form of blamelessness that can be contrasted against the perpetrator from which one 
demands accountability. This is especially true in terms of claims-making, where the 
figure of the child is often invoked as the ultimate symbol of innocence. 13  It is 
important to note how the designation of innocence and guiltlessness can be a process 
that is more illustrative of societal structures than the actual veracity of a victim’s 
claims. Brenner makes the point that the trope of the innocent victim in cases of rape 
severely circumscribed the manner in which their claims were handled. According to 
Brenner, “Within this framework, which has endured into the present day, only 
women who were sexually pure and thus chaste were capable of being raped. Once 
she had "fallen," it was assumed that a woman was always ready, and looking, for 
sex.” 14  The designation of victimhood, here, is only available to those who are 
deemed to ‘deserve’ that status. In the presence of gendered, racialized, and otherwise 
hegemonic structures, the designation of victimhood can be filtered through the lens 
of these societal understandings. Thus, the particular manner in which innocence is 
constructed and interpreted can be a useful indicator of hierarchies and hegemonies 
within societies and the international system. 
In transitional justice, the trope of the innocent victim takes on a distinctly 
political character.  As Luke Moffett notes, the trope of the innocent victim is “often 
used to deny victimhood to those who suffered due to their background or conduct, or 
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to legitimize violence against individuals or groups.”15 Laplante and Theidon outline 
exactly this process in the case of Peru. In Peru, “to be a victim today, one must claim 
innocence.”16 In the aftermath of Peru’s civil war between the state armed forces and 
the two rebel groups Sendero Luminoso (SL) and the Movimiento Revolucionario 
Tupac Amaru (MRTA), ‘claiming innocence’ has a distinct political meaning. Those 
who supported ‘subversives’ were understood to have lost their innocence in the 
process of defying the state, with distinct consequences.  According to Laplante and 
Theirdon, “national reparations plan specifically exclude members of subversive 
groups, whether or not victimized in the same war.” 17  The determination of 
‘innocence’ in contexts of political conflict, then, can take on distinctly political 
appearances. The trope of the innocent victim, according to Erin K. Baines, reduces 
the agency of people in conflicted context to “navigate in order to survive.”18 Baines 
argues that people “contest, resist, and protest gross violations of their person.”19 
However, those who resist the harms they experience can be denied the title of victim, 
simply the constructed image of ‘true’ victimhood is depoliticized. This construction 
of victimhood legitimizes the narratives of some victims, while leaving others 
troublingly excluded from the fold. 
The construction of victimhood in transitional justice is often conceived as the 
direct opposite to the construction of the perpetrator. The dichotomy between victims 
and perpetrators assumes that people navigating complex conflict scenarios can be 
neatly categorized in terms of their culpability and experiences of harm. However, as 
Govier and Verwoerd argue, “the dichotomy between ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ is 
neither exclusive nor exhaustive.”20 This binary framework is a poor representation of 
the lived experiences of people in conflict scenarios, as it excludes two possibilities: 
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the possibility of actors that exist as neither victims nor perpetrators, and the 
possibility of a single actor embodying both characteristics at different times. People 
navigate the spaces of criminality and victimhood in dynamic ways; they can be 
victims and perpetrators at the same instance, and even in the same interaction. As 
McEvoy and McConnachie argue, these changes can occur “depending on a whole 
range of variables—these are not static categories.” 21  The presumption of static 
categories allows transitional justice literature to speak of victims and perpetrators as 
concrete concepts, articulating a vision of victim’s needs and perpetrator culpability 
in coherent ways. When mapped onto instances of conflict, however, these concepts 
begin to lose some of their salience. Child soldiers have become paradigmatic cases 
of the contradictory constructions of “newly emergent subject forms” such as the 
victim and perpetrator. 22  Julie Bernath considers the cases of ‘complex political 
victims’ in Cambodia, who are “victims who simultaneously or successively 
experienced harm and participated in systems of oppression and political violence.”23 
Bernath makes the trenchant observation that the simplicity of the image of the victim 
in political violence “constitutes the first step in producing the political space for 
mass victimization,” as it “contributes to problematic differentiations between 
good/bad and us/them.” 24  The harms experienced by complex political victims 
complicates the search for reconciliation and peacebuilding, which often invokes the 
image of the victim and envisions these practices as victim-centered. 
5.2 Invoking the Victim  
The image of the victim is a potent clarion call for action, and it has been utilized as a 
rhetorical device in numerous transitional contexts to advocate for specific 
transitional justice processes. Susan Hirsch considers the debate on the 
implementation of Mato Oput in Uganda, and particularly clarifies that both sides of 
the debate argued on the basis of victims’ needs and interests. Hirsch writes that the 
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features of the practice were represented in polar opposite ways depending on the 
outlook of the discussants, “as if reflected in a series of fun-house mirrors that 
exaggerated its purported positive or negative qualities.”25 On one hand, there are 
those who characterize the processes as “well-respected responses to conflict dating 
from ‘time immemorial’ and with strong roots in Acholi culture.” 26  Others 
characterize the practices as recent constructions of tradition, “long severed from 
Acholi cultural practice—that were being forced onto a population by leaders with 
questionable motives.”27 The important element, here, is that both sides used the 
image of the victim to buttress their arguments, evaluating the use of ‘international’ 
or ‘local’ justice mechanisms by their impact on victims. This is indicative of the 
‘victim-centered approach’ to transitional justice, but it is also illustrative of how the 
image of the victim can become a rhetorical device used to forward the aims of a 
particular project or paradigm. Here, it is the “a general appeal to the cultural salience 
to victims” that is important to consider.28  
The seemingly simple task of ‘asking victims what they want’ is belied by 
myriad conceptual and pragmatic challenges.29 As discussed above, the designation of 
victimhood is not a straightforward process, and it is sometimes a difficult prospect to 
know exactly who ‘ask.’ Hirsch brilliantly outlines the ways in which the production 
of knowledge about victim’s wants and needs can be colored by the agendas and 
vantage points of the inquirer. Here, “‘For whom is the pollster working?’ becomes 
an important question that disavowals of political manipulation may not easily 
satisfy.”30 For this to be true, one does not necessarily have to ascribe a malicious 
intent to the organizations that produce and disseminate this knowledge. Rather, these 
“partisan attempts to illuminate victim’s interests” are the result of the application of 
pre-existing frameworks of knowledge to the conflicted contexts.31 As Hirsch argues, 
“representatives from human rights organizations were long involved in assessing the 
extent of the violence in the northern Uganda conflict and advocating for redress 
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through recognizable human rights processes.”32 The fact that these organizations that 
produced knowledge on victims would interpret and articulate what they saw in the 
language of human rights violations and redress is unsurprising. However, it is 
important to consider how the framing of ‘victim’s interests’ in this manner can 
distort the narratives and experiences of victims. 
The invocation of victim’s interests can be an exercise in instrumentalization. 
Transitional justice translates the powerful narrative of victim harms into normative 
prescriptions for social reshaping. According to Kieran McEvoy, victims’ stories can 
be invoked “in the pursuit of larger political and social goals such as reinforcing the 
rule of law, deterring future offenders, getting to the ‘truth’ of past violence and, of 
course, the pragmatic deal-making that is inherent in making peace.”33 This can have 
serious psychological impacts on the victims, whose narratives can be key “means to 
achieve a successful prosecution.”34 In retributive justice mechanisms, victims can be 
subjected to the troubles of an adversarial justice process, significant delays in the 
meting out of justice, and unrealistic expectations of the outcomes of the justice 
processes.35 All of this can be expected of the victim with the assumption that this 
will assist in the process of personal recovery, but mostly in the hopes that it will 
support societal recovery. However, as the following section shows, this 
instrumentalization is not exclusive to the retributive paradigm, it also features 
prominently in the primary mechanism of restorative justice: truth commissions.  
5.3 Settling Truth 
For Ruti Teitel, truth commissions represent “impunity’s antidote and amnesty’s 
analogue,” a fight against disappearance of crimes, and the reformulation of 
collective memory.36 The reach of truth commissions across the globe is breathtaking, 
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extending from Argentina, Canada, Chad, Guatemala, Haiti, South Africa, and 
Uganda, amongst others. The claim of the truth commission is a simple one: it is an 
attempt to ‘settle the account’ of collective memory so that the harms experienced by 
victims can be made material, and so that the victims of those crimes are not lost to 
history. As Teitel argues, “the disappearance of the citizen displays a perversely cruel 
and absolute sovereignty.” 37  The truth commission, then, attempts to restore the 
dignity lost by those victims, assuring that their injustices would not go unmarked. 
Chrisje Brants and Katrien Klep succinctly describe the relationship between 
transitional justice and memory this way: 
Transitional justice… (re)produces memories but aspires to more than that. 
“Justice” requires that the different theatres of memory are collected into one 
“truth” (Osiel’s “coherent collective memory,” Minow’s “national 
narrative”). This means that transitional justice can be understood as a 
mediator between different collec- tive memories. Moreover, unlike film, 
this mediator embodies the voice of (legal) authority. The version of past 
events that courts and truth commissions produce in their verdicts and 
reports is an authoritative claim of truth.38  
 
 Truth commissions translate victim narratives into an authoritative account of 
history, they attempt to ‘settle the account’ of the past by introducing a ‘truth’ that is 
tangible, provable and appreciable. This is an incredibly important process, as it 
renders victim accounts impervious to denial, forgetting and relativization.39 Thus, 
“truth commissions are at once socially embedded and transformative,” they are 
socially embedded as they draw from testimony to substantiate accounts, and 
transformative as they actively participate in the construction of social memory.40 
However, the production of an authoritative truth can become challenging when faced 
with the complex reality of conflict-affected contexts, where contested narratives of 
harm and victimhood are common. 
   Truth commissions are caught between competing aims, as they are 
simultaneously rooted in the immediate context of conflict and aspiring to move 
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beyond those very cleavages. 41  Although truth commissions regularly make truth 
claims about their findings, the reality is that the truth-seeking process requires an 
active, normative interpretation of the past.42 Molly Andrews draws out this dynamic 
this way, “we have a responsibility to remember, ‘to keep memory alive, not to 
forget’… But never forget what? Keep which memory alive?” 43  Ultimately, the 
production of collective memory in truth commissions involves the rendering of a 
verdict. It requires adjudicating “between contending positions by confirming or 
rejecting certain narratives and explanations that hold sway in public debates.”44 The 
process of combing through and divining ‘truth’ from these competing claims can 
have a marked impact on the collective memory of the past, as well as on the victims 
whose narratives are appraised, evaluated, and decided upon. 
 Although contested narratives continue to exist, the elevation of specific 
narratives to the authority of ‘truth’ carries problematic assumptions. Of course, there 
is the epistemological assumption that truth can be divined through a particular 
political process. But there is also a deeper ontological understanding about the nature 
and apprehension of ‘truth’ itself. While the particular mode of capturing truth is 
dialectic, there remains a “positivist assumption that a single truth is possible and 
identifiable,” which can complicate the reality that “multiple and contradictory truths 
may exist within a single interaction.”45 If this is true, then the particular ‘truths’ that 
are raised to the mantle of ‘truth’ can be illustrative of the pitfalls of social structures 
in transitional contexts. 
 The image of the ‘ideal victim’ has social, as well as political implications. 
Hegemonies of identity, social class and cleavage and gender can find their way into 
the authoritative account of the ‘truth’ established by truth commissions. The 
language of ‘hearing’ and ‘voicing’ narratives of truth can obscure the politics of 
erasure and silence that works behind the scenes. “People do not enter the public 
forum as equals,” and therefore “the stories of some people made it… more easily 
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into ‘history’ than those of others.”46 Elizabeth Jelin makes this case incredibly well 
in reference to the Nunca Más report that formed the basis for the determination of an  
authoritative truth in Argentina following the Dirty Wars. Here, ‘multiple 
marginalities,’ on the basis of class, ethnicity and region formed the official account 
of what happened in the Ledesma blackout (Apagón de Ledesma) in which hundreds 
were detained, and dozens forcibly disappeared. Here, “a master narrative of the 
Ledesma case developed in the national human rights community.”47 To be sure, this 
master narrative is informed by other narratives, but it also actively shapes the other 
narratives.  
The case of the date of the Ledesma blackout is instructive. According to the 
Nunca Más report, the Ledesma blackout occurred in July 27th, 1976. And yet, those 
that lived through the brutalization contest that it did not occur on July 27th, but 
instead on July 20th. As Jelin accounts, “Why commemorate on July 27, then? 
Clearly, because it is in the book.” 48  Jelin recounts relatives of the disappeared 
arguing that “they can put today, yesterday or tomorrow; you can go and change 
dates, but those of us who lived through it know. It was July 20, July 20, 1976.”49 
And yet, public commemorations of the Ledesma blackout occur, without fail, on 
July 27th. This has served to alienate the very victims that it was meant to honor. 
According to Jelin, “they did not participate in an event that they felt was not 
theirs.”50 This minute but incredibly meaningful example illustrates the manner in 
which those in authority can settle contested narratives of truth. However, the settling 
of these accounts does not diffuse contested truths, instead, the permeation of existing 
hegemonies can produce tension and silence. As Jelin explains, 
This is a story of class, region, and race. The events referred to seem rather 
minor. They are not registered by the media, by public opinion, or by state 
agencies. Nobody talks about them. Nobody interprets the microdynamics of 
the case in terms of class, ethnic, or racial cleavages. That is part of the 
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cultural silences of Argentina. Yet it is clear that in the (mostly muted) 
conflicts about the memories of the past, there are deeper social cleavages, 
which anteceded the specific events referred to. The emergence of the stories 
of the “others,” however, may only be circumstantial, unless there are deeper 
changes in the structures of power, locally and nationally.51  
 
The political aspect of the ‘ideal victim’ and the production of silence is 
salient here. In the Argentinian case outlined by Jelin, the isolated region of Jujuy was 
considered to be ‘subversive,’ which impacted significantly on the reception of their 
accounts of victimhood.52 However, the vision of history and politics forwarded by 
truth commissions depoliticizes the conflict and violence that makes them necessary. 
According to Greg Grandin, truth commissions historicize the past as a background 
against which the present can be contrasted, rather than viewing the structural 
conditions that contributed to conflict. Truth commissions can use avoidance of 
contentious topics in an attempt to diffuse and transform conflicted political 
landscapes. 53  However, as Bronwyn Leebaw argues, “depoliticization does not 
transcend the politics of transitional justice, but rather functions to obfuscate and 
naturalize the way that politics operate in the process of judging the past.” 54  As 
Grandin argues, “by presenting an interpretation of history as parable rather than as 
politics, largely denied the conditions that brought them into being.”55 Paradoxically, 
it seems, in the name of memory, truth commissions can institutionalize a particular 
form of forgetting. 
This form of forgetting has particular social ramifications when considered in 
light of the social project that transitional justice attempts to foster. According to 
Grandin, the historicity that is often reproduced in truth commissions mirrors 
“nationalism’s enabling paradox,” which is “the need to forget acts of violence 
central to state formation that can never be forgotten.”56 It is telling, then, that the 
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specific historical and political elements of the conflicts that germinated the truth 
commissions that proliferated in Latin America were depoliticized. Terror was not 
read “as an essential element in the consolidation of a new neoliberal order,” or “as an 
extension of a reactive campaign against social-democratic nationalist projects,” but 
instead “as a breakdown of social relations as but one more instance in a repetitive 
cycle of ‘interruptions in democratic rule.’”57   This limits the transformative and 
radical potential of truth-telling. The individual experiences of repression may here be 
captured, but the core interpretation of historical and political forces leaves something 
to be wanting.  According to Leebaw, this naturalizes “the compromises, distortions 
and asymmetries that frame their investigations,” and this in turn forecloses “ongoing 
debate regarding the terms of official memory in the process of political change.”58 
This serves as the moment of the construction of political truth that is meant to be the 
basis of the state and society going forward. 
Forgiveness, reconciliation and compassion are the cornerstones of restorative 
justice. According to the restorative justice argument, a realignment of social 
relations between the perpetrator and victim social change can begin. Of course, this 
understanding is wrought with the challenges of a fixed conception of ‘victim’ and 
‘perpetrator,’ but this must be left aside for the moment. The requirement for 
forgiveness clearly demands a significant contribution from the victim. Annalise 
Acorn argues that victims can be ‘compelled to compassion’ through this mandate. 
As Annalise Acorn asks, “how can a system of justice be structured around a general 
demand for such supererogatory patience and devotion from victims?”59 If the healing 
begins with the victims, it seems, there is an incentive for victim participation. But 
one can imagine contexts in which this is not the case. According to Acorn, “The 
significance of forgiveness to restorative justice lies in its possible contribution to the 
ultimate restorative goal of right-relation - that is, a lived relationship of mutual 
equality and respect.” 60  Note that this is not, itself, a victim-centered reality. 
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
58 Bronwyn Leebaw, Judging State-Sponsored Violence, 15. 
59 Annalise E. Acorn, Compulsory Compassion, 12. 
60 Ibid. 
81 
 
 
 
Therefore, Acorn argues, “if forgiveness is a necessary element of restorative justice, 
it is only instrumentally so.”61  
This does not mean that the function of or reason for forgiveness is never an 
agential decision on the victim’s behalf. However, it means that sometimes, the 
function of forgiveness, and a significant reason for its consistent invocation, is that it 
forwards the social project of transitional justice. The victim’s forgiveness, here, is an 
instrument in the wide-reaching social project of transitional justice. Consider, as 
well, the role that victims are meant to play in the process of reconciliation. The role 
is dualistic; it is intended to be a path of personal, as well as social recovery. The 
victim-witness bears a responsibility to herself, as well as to the social project of 
which her testimony is a part. However, there are tensions involved in the process that 
lead to the possibility of these two roles of the victim can come in conflict with one 
another. Thus, it is true that ‘the victim’ is a central figure in transitional justice, 
mooring the literature and practice in its normative and pragmatic understanding. 
However, the victim-centered approach in transitional justice is fraught with 
challenges. 
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Chapter 6  
6 Conclusion 
In the preceding chapters, I have outlined the ways in which the current state of 
transitional justice is entangled with, and often indebted to, the presence and 
workings of hegemony. I argued that this reality can frustrate the emancipatory aims 
of transitional justice. This concluding chapter begins by summarizing the critiques 
this thesis has forwarded thus far, and considering the implications that these 
criticisms have on current transitional justice theory and practice. This thesis ends on 
a note of meditation, as I consider the prospects of a transitional justice that discards 
these problematic assumptions and associations and reworks itself to confront 
hegemonic forces rather than bolstering them. 
6.1 Summary of Arguments 
The first chapter of this thesis, “Locating Transitional Justice in Historical 
Perspective,” evaluated the orthodox narrative of the emergence of transitional justice 
onto the international stage. The transitional justice origin story tells of an emergence 
onto the world stage in fits and starts, culminating in an eventual normative 
acceptance of transitional justice principles at a global level. The orthodox 
transitional justice history proceeds as follows: beginning with the auspicious 
opportunities presented by the end of the Second World War, transitional justice was 
temporarily hampered by the onset of the Cold War and the political distortions 
wrought by the bipolar world system. At the end of the Cold War, this narrative goes, 
a normative shift in the international system allowed for the procession of a ‘justice 
cascade,’ which itself became the centerpiece of a move towards transitional justice. 
However, this thesis argued that this transitional justice origin story relied on an 
active re-interpretation of the motives and actions of states and policymakers at 
seminal moments in each of these shifts. To demonstrate the revisionism inherent to 
the transitional justice origin story, this chapter considered the case of the Nuremberg 
trials, which many transitional justice scholars consider to be a pivotal moment in 
transitional justice history.  
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The Nuremberg trials, according to transitional justice scholars, were a 
symbolic moment of change in the post-WWII era. For transitional justice literature, 
the ‘Nuremberg legacy’ came to mean the first real challenge to the inviolability of 
state sovereignty. For transitional justice scholars, Nuremberg came to signify the 
moment when the jurisdiction of the state could no longer be utilized as a justification 
for the wanton deprivation of human rights for citizens. Contrary to this revisionist 
reading, however, the Nuremberg trials can be seen to buttress the authority of state 
sovereignty, as it was through the active invocation of the principle of sovereignty 
that the Allied powers justified their jurisdiction over the proceedings. This thesis 
argued that the repeated misreading of the substance and significance of the 
Nuremberg trials served a legitimizing function for transitional justice literature. This 
reading anchors the field in the moment of the creation of the modern state system, 
which grants transitional justice field a precedence and validity that it otherwise 
might not have had.  
The significance of this argument is twofold. First, it casts doubt on the 
orthodox narrative of transitional justice. But more crucially, it allows for a 
reorientation of emergence of transitional justice discourse in the twentieth century. 
Unmooring the rise of transitional justice from its dubious situation in the post-WWII 
era allows one to place it in the moment where the term ‘transitional justice,’ along 
with its normative aims and pragmatic goals actually came to fruition: the post-Cold 
War era. This, in turn, permits the analysis of transitional justice discourse in relation 
to an entirely different international arena, and places transitional justice discourse in 
dialogue with the geopolitical and ideational changes that were occurring at this 
precise moment. Thus, transitional justice can be considered in line with the ‘third 
wave of liberalization,’ the emergence of the United States as the world’s remaining 
superpower, and the ideological triumph of liberalism in the world system. In the 
proceeding chapters, it allows for transitional justice literature to be considered in 
concert with democratization, liberal peacebuilding, and the legacy of modernization 
theory.  
 “Transitional Justice: Fashioning the Liberal Democratic Polity?” is the 
second chapter of this thesis. This chapter considers the embedded end-goal of liberal 
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democracy in transitional justice literature, the problematic assumptions that 
undergird this end, and the implications of this democratic objective on the 
transitional justice project. The democratic peace thesis is central to understandings of 
the value and necessity of democracy in transitional justice. The democratic peace 
thesis argues that, as a general trend, democratic states in the international system do 
not go to war with one another. Transitional justice scholars use this thesis to argue 
that democratic states are, by nature, peaceful. As ‘transitional’ states are often 
wracked by war and social conflict, the lack of democracy is diagnosed as a principle 
problem for transitional states. Setting aside the contested validity of the democratic 
peace thesis itself, this argument stretches the democratic peace thesis to its 
conceptual breaking point. The democratic peace thesis makes no argument about the 
likelihood of democratic states to experience intrastate conflict, which is the sort of 
conflict that ‘transitional’ states are most likely to face. As well, the transitional 
justice assumption of the democratic peace thesis raises troubling concerns about the 
nature of power and hegemony in transitional justice prescriptions. It aligns 
transitional justice with the hegemonic aims of American foreign policy.  
The democracy promotion impulse embedded in transitional justice shares 
troubling resonances with the assumption and proliferation of modernization theory in 
the Cold War era. This is combined with the particular features of the moment of 
transitional justice’s emergence onto the world stage: unipolar American hegemony, 
the ideological triumph of liberal internationalism in the world system, and the 
proliferation of liberal peacebuilding theory and practice. Together, this indicates that 
transitional justice practice does the grunt work of laying a foundation for the creation 
and maintenance of liberal spaces across the world. This means the construction of 
liberal institutions from on high, in such a manner as to exclude all other possibilities 
of state formation and the concurrent construction of liberal subjects from below, 
those that are meant to populate these liberal states. Together, global governance of 
state-building, liberal peacebuilding and transitional justice can be seen to close this 
gap. This thesis demonstrated that the democratic peace thesis creates a security 
dilemma whereby all non-liberal democratic state formations and populations are 
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considered a threat to the ‘zone of peace.’ Transitional justice, this thesis argues, may 
be the technocratic solution to this security dilemma. 
The guiding question of this chapter is “who is transitional justice meant to 
serve?” If the scholars of transitional justice and the proponents of the democratic 
peace thesis are meant to be believed, the democratization of ‘transitional’ states will 
lessen past social conflict, meaningfully engage the populace in the present and allow 
for the inclusion in the international community in the future. However, these hopes 
are pinned on a rationale for democratization that, at its core, is about the preservation 
of order in the international system and not the society in question. In the face of the 
script of marketization and democratization, alternative forms of governance are 
effectively excluded from the outset. This discord is made particularly troubling when 
understood in the context of a radical program of social engineering where liberal 
democracy is the pre-ordained outcome. 
The third chapter, “Hybridity to the Rescue?” considers transitional justice in 
relation to current peacebuilding practice. It begins by outlining the rise and crisis of 
liberal peacebuilding in the international arena. Liberal peacebuilding attempts to 
realizes the hopes and promises of the liberal peace. Similar to the democratic peace, 
the liberal peace is constituted by an ideological and political commitment to 
marketization and democratization. In the immediate post-Cold War era, the hope of 
the liberal peace extending to all corners of the globe encouraged the enlargement of 
international organizations and their deeper penetration into matters of conflict. 
Transitional justice, as a discipline, is an integral element of the liberal peacebuilding 
paradigm. It emerged on the coattails of this changing wind in the international 
system, and the goals of ushering in the ‘rule of law’ were understood to be central to 
the attainment of the liberal peace. 
The material and ideological elements of liberal peacebuilding were quickly 
called into question, as the liberal peacebuilding paradigm was frustrated by 
intractable conflict, peacebuilding failures and challenges to the interventionist 
posture of international organizations. For liberal peacebuilding, and for transitional 
justice in particular, the solution was understood to be a turn to the ‘local.’ I argue 
that the turn towards the local was affected by two problems: the problem of knowing 
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the local and the problem of local knowledge. The problem of knowing the local is 
the essentialized portrait of the ‘local’ that emerges from the instrumentalist approach 
that peacebuilding and transitional justice scholars used in relation to ‘transitional’ 
societies. Here, a binary opposition is drawn between the ‘local’ and the 
‘international,’ with problematic results. This leads to the problem of local 
knowledge, which is the process by which an artificial script and understanding of the 
‘local’ is produced that can be translated into the language of technocratic solutions.  
From this grounding, I then analyze the ways that these problematic 
assumptions can impact the interfaces at which the ‘local’ and the ‘international’ 
interact. Hybrid tribunals and the incorporation of customary justice mechanisms, two 
manners in which transitional justice has attempted to incorporate the local into 
transitional justice, are considered from this perspective. Ultimately, I argue that 
hybrid attempts at transitional justice fails to escape the logic of the liberal peace. 
This is because the rethinking of approaches with local communities has largely been 
in the procedural realm, and does not reach the theoretical assumptions that undergird 
the field. As a result, many attempts at ‘local ownership,’ can be read as attempts to 
generate legitimacy for the overarching social project of transitional justice. 
The final chapter of this thesis is “Constructing the Victim, Settling 
Accounts.” It follows from the earlier discussion of agency and constraint in 
transitional justice, as experienced through hybrid interfaces between the ‘local’ and 
‘international’.  As new global institutions are created, new subjects must also be 
created to populate those institutions. The victim in transitional justice is one example 
of a new subject on the global stage. This chapter considers the construction of 
victimhood in transitional justice, the invocation of the victim in transitional justice 
and the neutralization of contesting narratives of victimhood through transitional 
justice mechanisms. The neatly categorized binaries between victim and perpetrator 
in transitional justice require deconstruction. The idealized image of the victim in 
transitional justice is of a ‘blameless victim,’ which can have the effect of 
depoliticizing the manner in which individuals navigate conflicted landscapes. The 
image of the victim is invoked in transitional justice in order to forward policy 
proposals, even as the impulse to ‘ask the victims what they want,’ is mediated 
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through a liberal filter. Thus, needs and wants of the victims of a conflict can be 
distorted for distinctly political ends, even if that is not the intended effect of the 
inquirer.  
Contested narratives of victimhood are settled through the process of 
‘reconciling the past,’ particularly through the transitional justice mechanism of truth 
commissions. Truth commissions aim to ‘settle the truth,’ and to come to a resolution 
regarding the injustices of the past. This is significant because truth commissions are 
meant to serve a dual purpose, they are meant to remedy personal injury as well as 
provide a basis for nation-building. In effect, however, through authoritative appeals 
to the Truth, truth commissions can cement in place the same unjust political 
dynamics that propagated the conflict that made them necessary. 
6.2 Imagining Transitional Justice Anew 
The rule of law, accountability, reconciliation and justice constitute the cornerstone of 
the transitional justice enterprise. These are all ‘essentially contested concepts,’ 
meaning that their utility, application and implementation are ceaselessly under 
negotiation. 1  At the very moment of its utterance, the invocation of a contested 
concept inspires dialogues that comb through meanings and create meanings anew.  
And yet, the particular manner in which transitional has reconciled the contested 
landscape that it navigates seems to have been to ignore these paradigmatic debates 
altogether. Transitional justice has constructed a literature and practice, complete with 
a toolkit, atop a single answer to the questions inspired by these concepts. As I have 
argued throughout this thesis, there are many problems with the liberal register in 
which transitional justice occurs. But these problems emanate from the initial effort to 
close down paradigmatic discussions about these essentially contested concepts 
through technocratic language and appeals to pragmatism.  
Homogeneity, which is the intended outcome of the liberal peace, cannot be 
the guidepost for transitional justice. As Derrida notes, there is a “necessary iterability 
                                                 
1 Christine Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field,’” 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 (2008), 27. 
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of justice,” which is “foreign to symmetry, heterogeneous and heterotrophic.” 2 
Contested concepts provide a universe of possibilities to select, reject and renew. 
Stymying this essential process of negotiation inherent to contested concepts has 
grave consequences for the field. The process of coming to a single answer in 
response to the infinite potentiality offered by contested concepts forces transitional 
justice to assume a hegemonic posture. This can “close our understandings of 
justice,” to those that meet certain pre-defined criteria.3 It can also allow the politics 
of hegemony, coercion and domination to work through the transitional justice 
process unchecked. In denying the contestations inherent to justice seeking, indeed, 
those very contestations that generate justice, transitional justice forecloses the 
critique of hegemonic forces that should guide its pursuit. With the definitions of 
‘justice’ preset, the end-goal of the liberal democratic peace programmed-in, and an 
instrumentalist approach to victims and the ‘local’ to achieve these determined goals, 
transitional justice loses its most indispensable asset: its potential for emancipation.  
This is a disappointment. Transitional justice is a promising endeavor. It seeks 
reconciliation after conflict, justice in the face of mass atrocity, and 
acknowledgement for victims in a sphere which silences and marginalizes them. 
These goals are laudable, essential, and liberatory. But, my research implies, the 
manner in which these concepts have been treated precludes their realization. An 
alternative vision of transitional justice is not only possible, but necessary. Promising 
strides have been recently made be some scholars in the realm of peacebuilding, 
which transitional justice could certainly incorporate into the field. The second wave 
of the local turn in peacebuilding emphasizes everyday agency, resistance to 
hegemony and the power of subaltern populations in order to mount a devastating 
critique of liberal peacebuilding.4 This critique reorients peacebuilding scholarship 
                                                 
2 Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority,” in Acts of Religion, ed. Gil 
Anidjar (New York: Routledge, 2002), 250. 
3 David Hoogenboom, “Theorizing ‘Transitional Justice’” (PhD diss. Western University, 2014). 
4 See Roger Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), Oliver P. Richmond and Audra Mitchell, “Towards a Post-
Liberal Peace: Exploring Hybridity via Everyday Forms of Resistance, Agency, and Autonomy,” in 
Hybrid forms of peace: From everyday agency to post-liberalism, ed. Oliver P. Richmond and Audra 
Mitchell (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), Oliver P. Richmond, A 
Post-Liberal Peace: The Infrapolitics of Peacebuilding (United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis, 2011). 
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towards a vision of hybridity which acknowledges disparities in power and allows for 
the prospect of conflicting meanings of the contested concept of ‘peace.’ Driving 
transitional justice thought and practice in this direction would illuminate the space at 
the margins of the field for the construction of new, emancipatory paradigms. It 
would allow marginalized and subaltern populations to participate in the process of 
knowledge and policy production. And, most importantly, it would eschew the 
assumptions that force us to bound the possible universe of justice.  
As transitional justice enters the ‘paradoxical moment of fieldhood’ where it 
becomes self-critical and contesting voices clamor for inclusion, transitional justice is 
presented with an opportunity.5 Instead of holding fast to the problematic assumptions 
that led to field to a ‘premature midlife crisis,’ a critical reappraisal of transitional 
justice thought and practice is in order.6 This requires more than an attempt to expand 
the field in superficial or procedural ways, such as the inclusion of ‘local ownership,’ 
or a reorientation towards socioeconomic issues. This means more than the invention 
of a new transitional justice mechanism, or the tailoring of an already existing one. It 
entails a hollowing out of the flawed assumptions embedded in transitional justice 
literature, including its goals, its desires and its methods. Bounding the limits of the 
field, holding close its untenable assumptions and refusing to meet the demands of 
reconstruction will likely lead to irrelevance and atrophy. If the goals of transitional 
justice are to hold any true significance, we must constantly insist that transitional 
justice act as a force for the dismantling of hegemonic structures, rather than the 
vehicle for delivering them. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
5 Christine Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field,’” 
13. 
6 Ibid. 
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